To be fair, Summers has not (not yet, anyway) advocated a rollback of globalisation. But it cannot be taken complacently for granted that calls for its rollback will not become a potent issue in American politics; Hillary Clinton for instance, wants to renegotiate aspects of NAFTA. It is also supremely ironical, that the very proponents of an ardent globalisation in the US are now advocating a more contextual approach, arguing for a greater democratic legitimisation of globalisation. Indeed all of Summers technical arguments — the spectre of increased inequality, the challenge of deep structural adjustment to a world where, for the perhaps the first time since the 17th century, the West will face serious competition in both muscle and brain power, and the prospect of rootless elites — have been around for a while. But, as Benjamin Friedman argued, economic contraction can also lead to an intellectual and political contraction. While there is no reason to be alarmist yet, a deep recession could turn ideological currents more swiftly than we realise.

The third prong of American politics was a great confidence in American power. There is no question that Iraq has shaken American politics in all kinds of subtle and unsubtle ways. But surprisingly, its effect on America’s intellectual and policy elites is more muted than one might suppose. First of all, there is still the widespread tendency to think of the quagmire in Iraq being a result of merely contingent incompetence and mistakes, not something that was structurally built into the way America conceives of its power and role in the world. Second, across the board, whether it be realists or liberals, there is still an ardent desire to hold on to American pre-eminence and hegemony. While people disagree on the means, there is still no candid acknowledgment that the American role in the world will have to undergo a massive readjustment. The new fascination with the Concert of Democracies in policy-making circles for instance, where democracies of the world band together against a whole range of countries — such as China and Russia — is another attempt to give the US an ideologically based role in the world. Phillip Bobbit’s recent argument, in his otherwise powerful Terror and Consent, for the European Union and the US to bandwagon together is another symptom of this closing of ranks. This is where arguments over the looming challenge of China will work politically.

... contd.