When the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) returned from Sri Lanka in 1989, their campaign in the Island Country was dubbed as “India’s Vietnam”. The same LTTE that proved to be the bête noire for the Indian Army, has now been decimated by the Sri Lankan Army. The two diametrically opposite achievements make it, but natural, for questions to arise.

At the strategic level, the Indian Army was fighting someone else’s war. The Indian political leadership did not display the maturity expected of them in such circumstances. It (India) tried to act like a regional power without political will, unity of purpose, military might and economic strength, all of which was needed for such a mighty venture.

Sent on a policing mission, the Indian Army ended up fighting a guerilla war. The naive rhetoric, “LTTE will be brought down to its knees in three days”, showed how a young Prime Minister was misled by his advisors. Mid way through the campaign, the government in Tamil Nadu changed and the Centre was not sure of its support.  Under such circumstances, the operations were doomed to fail from the inception stage itself. Indian intelligence agencies like the RAW also failed to deliver. The Army commanders were never given a free licence as it always had to be ‘orders from Delhi’.

Compare it to the way the Rajapaksha Government went about its task. Its diplomatic moves to get the LTTE declared as a “terrorist group”, lobbying in the UN to get Russian and Chinese support against the LTTE, use of its full military might and a determined leadership with the president, defence minister and military chief all working in unison —- the country displayed the political will and sagacity needed to succeed in such operations.

... contd.