On the face of it, the grumbling in the South Block that Nepal’s new prime minister, Prachanda, has presented himself in Beijing before travelling to New Delhi may seem trivial. Underlying this quibble, however, is a deeper challenge that our security establishment has refused to recognise — the consequences of China’s rise for India’s periphery. Kathmandu’s explanation that Prachanda’s decision was defined by the circumstances — the need to attend the closing ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics — does not wash. That Prachanda had avoided visiting India even before the general elections that propelled him to power reflects a deeper problem.

If the Maoist leader had chosen to deliberately injure India, his foreign minister, Upendra Yadav, adds insult when he says Nepal seeks “equal ties” with Beijing and New Delhi. That is precisely the problem. The Maoist emphasis on “equidistance” between China and India is diplomatic code in Kathmandu for an end to the very special relationship with New Delhi. Geography as well as shared history and culture have bound Nepal and India in ways that are not comparable to any other bilateral relationship of either country. Although Maoists had in the past called for breaking Nepal’s those bonds, New Delhi had assumed that the Maoists, once in power, would stay true to Nepal’s strategic tradition.

Prachanda’s departure from Nepal’s natural logic for a strong relationship with India can only be understood in the context of Beijing’s new powerplay in South Asia. To be sure, Beijing always disputed India’s claim to a special role in the subcontinent and the political elites in our neighbourhood, including those in Kathmandu, were quite happy to play the perennial “China card”. What has changed in the last few years is the economic and political salience of the China option for our neighbours. A rising China, with its determined strategic activism in our borderlands, is now poised to trump

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