Rawalpindi’s Own

Hachette

Rs 550

Pages: 352

A quarter of a century after it was founded to wage jihad in Afghanistan,the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),has emerged as one of the main threats to India’s national security.

LeT’s organisation of the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai underlined its extraordinary motivation and the kind of state support it enjoys in Pakistan,especially from the army and the ISI.

Yet,there is little knowledge of LeT’s origins,ideology,and its evolution as the principal sword arm of the Pakistan army against India,at a time when the power gap between the two countries is rapidly widening in favour of Delhi.

While there has been little scholarship in India on the mushrooming extremist organisations in Pakistan,there has been growing American and Western interest in the LeT.

LeT’s suspected links with the al Qaeda and its possible role in promoting home-grown terror in the United States have resulted in increasing Western interest. Stephen Tankel,from the King’s College,London,provides the first comprehensive and insightful account of the LeT.

Tankel’s very readable story of the LeT is organised in three parts. The first part traces the origin and evolution of the LeT by explaining the extremist milieu in Pakistan that developed from the late 1970s under two impulses — the promotion of a jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the active injection of extremist Islam into the body politic of Pakistan by General Zia-ul-Haq.

The second part focuses on the LeT operations during the 1990s,with its main emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir,growing infrastructure in Pakistan,and the development of its transnational networks.

The third part deals with LeT’s successful adaptation and survival in the post-911 environment amidst Western demands on Pakistan to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism. There is a separate chapter on the LeT’s execution of the Mumbai attacks and its growing activity after 26/11. The third section also deals with the LeT’s interest in targeting the US and its allies in the last decade and its increasing collaboration with other terror outfits.

The volume concludes with an assessment of the implications of the LeT activity on Pakistan and its relations with India and the West. Washington had paid little attention to the LeT until 26/11,given the primary US focus on al Qaeda. After the Mumbai attacks,which saw the killing of American,Israelis and other Western citizens,there has been growing international pressure on the Pakistan government to crack down on the LeT.

India too has insisted since 26/11 on bringing the LeT,and its leader Hafeez Mohammed Sayeed,to book. But neither the West nor India has had any impact on the solid bonds between the Pakistan army and the LeT. Tankel explains why.

One,unlike many other outfits,the LeT does not target the state in Pakistan. Two,it provides much needed leverage vis-a-vis India. Tankel argues that “while Pakistan has made efforts to battle some of the militant groups operating on its soil,selectivity with regard to which outfits to take action against remains the order of the day”.

Tankel sums up Pakistani attitude to the LeT,by referring to a rhetorical question from an ISI official. “Who benefits if we go after the Lashkar? And who pays?” “His response: ‘India and Pakistan’”.

While Tankel points to the potential threat from the LeT to the West,he concludes that the organisation is nowhere near becoming the next al Qaeda. He argues that India will remain the principal target of the LeT.

The book reminds us that India can’t rely on Western pressure on the Pakistan army to dismantle the LeT. Delhi will have to find its own means to cope with the LeT’s rising power and its entrenched alliance with Rawalpindi.