Dr Singh’s statement reflects the wide political consensus that after Pakistan’s failure to show good faith post-Mumbai, bilateral talks cannot be returned to where they were pre-26/11. But it also reflects the realism that not having channels of official communication is simply not an option. Engagement is inevitable. Engagement, however, cannot be within the old framework. With the Mumbai attack in November 2008 and its diplomatic aftermath, India and Pakistan lost two years of progress in the peace talks, especially on Kashmir. Crucially, that experience highlighted a change in Pakistan’s internal power structure: there was no single powerful interlocutor to conduct high-level engagement with India. Pervez Musharraf’s successor as army chief has shown no interest in involving himself in the process; the army has for some reason chosen to turn its back on the peace process. And experience suggests the inability of Pakistan’s political leadership to deliver on guarantees on cross-border terrorism.

When talks begin, as they must, the framework would of necessity factor in Pakistan’s fractured political system. Therefore the purpose of engagement must also be to produce some internal change in Pakistan, in changing how its political and military leaderships see the possibly mutual benefits of stronger bilateral ties. This is a change that

is in India’s interest, and New Delhi must reach out to the widest possible array of opinion-makers and shapers in Pakistan. India’s aim: that its internal consensus for peace should eventually be mirrored by a similar consensus across the border.