Given the widely divergent strategic goals and policies followed by India and the US in the past, particularly on nuclear non-proliferation, the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was never going to be as simple as one, two, three! The US, since the mid-sixties, has actively sought to deny proliferation of nuclear weapons/technology outside the P5 countries. It was the principal promoter of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). President Clinton revised the US nuclear strategy and doctrine for a more active role when new threshold states including India started emerging. The Defense Counter-proliferation Initiative of 1993 included eight functional areas: intelligence, counterforce capabilities, surveillance, inspections, passive defence, active defence, export control and counter terrorism. President George Bush upgraded it to a ‘forward policy’ in 2002 by including pre-emptive or preventive use of force in handling proliferation and ‘taking anticipatory actions to defend’. For much of the Cold War period, India’s bilateral relations with the US had remained rancorous partly due to different perceptions of the world order but mostly due to US support to Pakistan. Some of those doubts continue to persist. When India blasted its way out of nuclear ambiguity on May 11,1998, causing a major setback to non-proliferation, the US reaction was immediate and severe. Given this, the tight-rope walking involved in negotiating this deal can well be imagined, especially after Dr Manmohan Singh committed in Parliament that India’s strategic autonomy shall not be compromised in any way, and the US Congress passed the Hyde Act in December 2006. It is evident that the 22-page ‘The 123 Agreement’, named after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954, worked out after two years of tough negotiations cannot and will not meet every aspiration of the two parties in perpetuity. But I believe that, despite some doubts in a toothcomb analysis, India’s strategic autonomy has not been compromised. One, the Agreement does not impinge on India’s military strategic programmes. Two, it does not deny us the right to carry out nuclear tests. The tests will no doubt cost us a lot, but that ought to be weighed against (a) our ability to build strategic reserves, (b) the strategic circumstance requiring further tests, and (c) our determination in worldwide sanctions imposed after the Shakti nuclear tests in May 1998. Given India’s new stature, any sanctions even if imposed would be less effective. Three, the right to re-process the spent fuel is not denied. Again, there is some conditionality of ‘arrangements and procedures’. But even if there is a delay or denial in such ‘arrangements and procedures’, no one can walk away with the spent fuel from India without the government’s consent. Four, the Agreement does not grant or promise dual use technologies to India. But such inputs cannot be stopped once other governments and multinational companies, after NSG approval, begin investing in India’s nuclear power generation plants. Overall, the shadow of the Hyde Act notwithstanding, the 123 Agreement concedes more to India than what many had expected. Given the nature of our polity, the debate on the 123 Agreement can be expected to carry on even after all pending steps are taken to make it operational. But the real difficulties in its implementation may arise in a crisis situation on which India and the US do not see eye to eye, or if there is a souring of bilateral relations. What matters then is not so much the fine print, but the political will to look after national interests. There are many political leaders and parties who believe that by signing the 123 Agreement, India would become a US camp follower. This is not necessarily the case. In the present world order, a nation of India’s standing can and should play a non-aligned, independent role and cooperate or compete with other nations, depending upon its national interests. However this too depends largely on political will. Globalisation and India’s enhanced status will require a more active participation in international security issues. Have we developed the necessary strategic culture and political will to do this? Traditionally, India has seldom been demanding on strategic matters. It has been reluctant about using its hard power even when critical national security interests were threatened. One reason for this is the lack of political consensus. While we discuss the 123 or other agreements, it must be realised that a nation’s strategic culture and political will to make effective use of its soft and hard power potential is an essential requirement for their implementation in national security interests. Also, while it is necessary to discuss national security concerns in politics; playing politics with national security can be harmful. The writer is former chief of army staff and president, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi
