One, the Agreement does not impinge on India’s military strategic programmes. Two, it does not deny us the right to carry out nuclear tests. The tests will no doubt cost us a lot, but that ought to be weighed against (a) our ability to build strategic reserves, (b) the strategic circumstance requiring further tests, and (c) our determination in worldwide sanctions imposed after the Shakti nuclear tests in May 1998. Given

India’s new stature, any sanctions even if imposed would be less effective. Three, the right to re-process the spent fuel is not denied. Again, there is some conditionality of ‘arrangements and procedures’. But even if there is a delay or denial in such ‘arrangements and procedures’, no one can walk away with the spent fuel from India without the government’s consent. Four, the Agreement does not grant or promise dual use technologies to India. But such inputs cannot be stopped once other governments and multinational companies, after NSG approval, begin investing in India’s nuclear power generation plants. Overall, the shadow of the Hyde Act notwithstanding, the 123 Agreement concedes more to India than what many had expected.

Given the nature of our polity, the debate on the 123 Agreement can be expected to carry on even after all pending steps are taken to make it operational. But the real difficulties in its implementation may arise in a crisis situation on which India and the US do not see eye to eye, or if there is a souring of bilateral relations. What matters then is not so much the fine print, but the political will to look after national interests. There are many political leaders and parties who believe that by signing the 123 Agreement, India would become a US camp follower. This is not necessarily the case. In the present world order, a nation of India’s standing can and should play a non-aligned, independent role and cooperate or compete with other nations, depending upon its national interests. However this too depends largely on political will.

... contd.