The continued alienation of the urban Kashmiri from the Indian state is reflected in the response to the question related to a preferred solution to Kashmir: an overwhelmingly large percentage preferring ‘independence’ to remaining with India. And yet this was not the only option that they were thinking of. On being asked whether they agreed that state should be given greater autonomy within the Indian Constitution, a large number (69 per cent) responded in the affirmative. That the Kashmiris could show their preference for ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy within the Indian Constitution’ in the same breath reflects the extent of ambivalence within Kashmiri politics today, especially when the urge for peace and normalcy is at its strongest.

For further illustrations of the ambivalence of the Kashmiri mind, it may be interesting to reflect on the responses to some of the other questions asked. For instance, respondents very strongly endorsed the viewpoint that the situation in the state has improved since 2002. Interestingly, the number of people who feel this is greater in Srinagar (79 per cent) than in Jammu city (63 per cent). Srinagar, it may be noted, represents the most sceptical part of the population even within the Valley. In 2002 the city had displayed its utter lack of faith in the electoral process by largely boycotting it. The city has always reflected its support for separatist politics. A call for a bandh from a separatist or militant organisation can evoke a total response here.

For such a sceptical population to say that the situation has improved since 2002 is significant. First, it is an endorsement of the ongoing peace process. Kashmiris, stuck in a cycle of violence since the late eighties, have been looking for an opportunity for an ‘honourable exit’ since the late nineties. The peace process initiated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2004 has not only sustained itself through a change of the political regime from NDA to UPA but also brought about certain tangible results in the form of ‘soft borders’ — making greater interaction between the two sides of Kashmir possible.

However, the greatest tangible result of the peace process is the decline in violence. With India and Pakistan being engaged in talks, militancy has been controlled to a great extent, bringing a sense of normalcy to the common Kashmiri. One can add another dimension to these developments — the extension of the political space since 2002. With the predominance of what Kashmiris call the ‘gun culture’ throughout the nineties, the political process was marginalised. Today, there is a new vibrancy. Not only are issues of common concern raised here but even those that earlier figured only within the realm of separatist politics. The demand for dialogue with militant organisations, the condemnation of human rights violations by the security forces and the opening of the border between the two sides of Kashmir are issues now being raised by mainstream political parties, both within the assembly and outside it. Mainstream politics overlapping with separatist politics has generated pressure not just upon the separatist leadership. It has also created ambivalence in the average Kashmiri’s response to politics.

The ambivalence becomes more obvious when one goes through other responses. Although Kashmiris are known to strongly resent the Indian state, the survey shows that this resentment is more focused on the coercive arm of the state rather than its political institutions. Around 85 per cent respondents reposed either no trust or a very little trust in the army. Responses to the police are similar. As against this, the percentage of those who show a lack of trust in the Indian Parliament and Election Commission is 31.9 per cent and 32.8 per cent respectively, even as 41.6 per cent respondents indicated trust in Parliament and 33.6 per cent, in the EC. The response to the national government is also quite positive — 44.7 per cent respondents expressed positive trust in it. Interestingly, the level of trust in the national government is higher than in the provincial government (40.7 per cent).

Despite the ambivalence, the survey clearly shows that Kashmiris want the peace process to move on: 96 per cent respondents believe peace should return in whatever manner. For the peace process to move on they recommend that the Centre hold talks with the Hurriyat Conference (99.6 per cent) and militant groups (98.2 per cent). Another significant finding is the clear rejection of a communal solution to the dispute — 74 per cent rejected the idea of dividing the state into three units while 81 per cent wanted the Pandits to be brought back to the Valley, and as many as 87.6 per cent respondents affirmed that the Kashmiri struggle is against the Indian government and not the Indian people.

We need to understand better what these figures reveal. They could offer a deeper understanding of political responses in the region almost two decades after the onset of militancy and separatist politics.

The writer is professor of political science, University of Jammu