Opinion Relationship advice

First,India needs to take ownership of the relationship and proactively define both their vision for the bilateral relationship as well as their broader role in Asia and beyond. Many observers feel that the remarkable upswing in Indo-US relations over the past decade has largely been an American-driven effort with Washington working hard to “pull” a reluctant New Delhi along. While some of this may have had to do with the polarising sentiments that the Bush administration evoked,President Obama’s multilateral approach to foreign affairs complements India’s traditional world-view. Hence,India’s political leaders should take the lead and clearly enunciate a bilateral roadmap that advances India’s economic,strategic and developmental interests. As part of this effort,India could announce a follow-up to the moderately successful Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).

Secondly,creating a relationship without limits requires New Delhi to think about the benefits that can accrue to the US from closer ties. Demands for reciprocity and equality must be matched by action on both sides. While India stands to benefit significantly in the near-term from access to American tech and defence materials,the tangible returns to Washington are less clear. Obviously,access to lucrative Indian defence contracts are one such benefit,however even more important would be assistance in stabilising both Afghanistan and Pakistan. India has already been playing a much appreciated role in Afghanistan. As the relative costs of Indian labour translates into more ‘bang-per-buck’ vis-à-vis western developmental agencies,it might serve the interests of all parties if western aid is channelled through Indian,Pakistani,Turkish and other non-western NGOs. More importantly,US and India need to engage in a serious discussion on future stability in the region.

Finally,to be able to manage its complex bilateral relationships,India needs to change the structure,functioning and capabilities of its foreign-policy and national security bureaucracies. At present,there are only around 750 foreign-service officers in the MEA to engage with the entire global community. No matter how brilliant or hardworking they are,it is humanly impossible for these officials to competently track the myriad issues (strategy,economy,trade,cultural and people-to-people ties) involved in bilateral relations between major powers. Hence,despite the transformation in US-India relations over the last decade,the number of Indian officials at the embassy in Washington DC has remained unchanged. Similarly,at the MEA headquarters in South Block only five officers are assigned to cover all of the Americas. The defence ministry also lacks the capability to engage other countries on international security issues,with 90 per cent of their personnel focused on acquisition and only one joint secretary handling global security cooperation. As a result,in recent years,a number of training exercises between the Indian military and other foreign forces have been called off at the last moment leading to a loss of credibility. This has led to a legitimate complaint,made most prominently by Dan Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations,that India lacks the institutional arrangement to emerge as a global power.

Ultimately,if the Indo-US relationship is truly important to India,the government needs to expend political capital to educate the public on the merits of closer cooperation. Of course this will be influenced by the Obama adminstration’s policies,but to proactively shape them,India needs to put forward its own big-picture ideas when Manmohan Singh pays a state visit to the White House next month.

Anit Mukherjee is a PhD candidate at the School of Advanced Studies,Johns Hopkins University and Walter Ladwig is a PhD candidate at Oxford University.