Transcripts of conversations — between Kosgin and Shastri, between Kosygin and Ayub and between Shastri and Ayub — if and when released would fill a tome. However, much of what transpired between the threesome is known. Let me cite only two highlights.

First, Shastri had overcommitted himself to not withdrawing from the Haji Pir Pass that the Indian Army had captured at “very high sacrifice” with Shastri’s “approval”. On hearing this from the Indian Prime Minister, Kosygin was disappointed and depressed. Yet he argued with Shastri in the most courteous and friendly terms. He had obviously done his homework thoroughly because he gave several compelling reasons why the Indian stand on Haji Pir was untenable. The UN Security Council, he pointed out, had unanimously ordered the two sides to withdraw to their positions on August 5 (the date on which Pakistani infiltrations into Kashmir were detected). The Council was keeping the entire issue under review and was ready to take further measures to establish peace. What if it took new measures under the mandatory Part VII of the UN Charter?

 Moreover, said the Soviet premier, China was India’s main enemy. During the 1965 war it had made threatening noises but taken no military action because of international pressure. This constraint on China, which had sent India a threatening note even during the Tashkent talks, would vanish if the talks broke down because of Indian refusal to evacuate Haji Pir. And Kosygin gently reminded Shastri that the Soviet Union was a party to the Security Council’s resolution and could not endorse any violation of it.

... contd.