But that hypothesis has two sub-hypotheses. First, reforms require legislative changes and the Left was obstructing those. Substantial liberalisation can be undertaken by the executive and neither the Left nor the Common Minimum Programme was a constraint there. If legislative changes are a pre-condition for liberalisation, there is a problem in 2009 too, with the Congress not possessing numbers in the Rajya Sabha. Logically, we will then revisit the issue in 2014 and explain why these reforms didn’t occur under UPA-II and why they might occur under UPA-III.

The second sub-hypothesis is that the Congress desires reforms.

Despite the 1991-93 (not 1996) aura, this isn’t a proposition supported by evidence. The test case is the HRD ministry under UPA-I, obstructed neither by the CMP nor by the ministry being hijacked by allies. Sure, there are different strands of reforms and, with its left-of-centre ideology, the Congress perceives rural and social sectors to be important. With a jaundiced pro-market eye, you can’t castigate the UPA for not liberalising FDI in retail.

That’s a fair point. But if the liberalisation desire in rural and social sectors is true, the ministries the Congress should immediately have announced (without granting them to allies) are agriculture, health, human resource development, law and justice and rural development. That’s where the cutting edge of social sector reforms will be. Instead, the reported haggling has been over economic ministries historically perceived to be important, and there are few knights who are pure of heart. Sherlock Homes got it absolutely right in “A Study in Scarlet”: “What you do in this world is a matter of no consequence. The question is, what can you make people believe you have done.” On economic reforms proper, what precisely did UPA-I achieve? Nothing beyond NREGA. With the economy chugging along at 8.5 per cent, a proposition (even if questionable) can be advanced. Why do you need reforms to rock the boat? Now, with the downturn, and with export sectors like garments and diamonds hit, you need revival packages. However, even with the government doing nothing beyond monetary policy loosening and with the transient credit squeeze easing, growth will be back to 6.5 per cent in September and 7 per cent from 2009-10. Consequently, the hypothesis that crisis will drive reforms is also dubious. By the time 100-day packages are formulated, the economy will have begun to recover on its own steam.

... contd.