The problem is not one of protocol. Realists don’t mind diplomatic crawling if an important national purpose is served. But it is difficult to fathom India’s gains at Yekaterinburg. Meanwhile, the contradictions between India’s interests and those of Russia and China in the Great Game territory have become sharper. Russia would love to see the US humbled in Afghanistan. India, on the other hand, wants the Taliban defeated in the Af-Pak region. If the US turns its back on Afghanistan, Beijing knows, Kabul will come under the sway of Pakistan, China’s all-weather friend. India’s interest is the opposite — preserving Kabul’s autonomy vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India can’t object to the Chinese and Russian definition of their self-interests in Afghanistan. But there is no reason why Delhi should become a clapper boy for Beijing and Moscow in Central Asia. Delhi’s differences Beijing and Moscow on the Af-Pak region are real and must be addressed purposefully. That, however, can only be done at solid bilateral engagements with the Chinese and Russian leaders; not at the diplomatic jamboree that Yekaterinburg promises to be.

Try the Saudis

Unlike his predecessor Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Dr. Singh does not much enjoy travel. That limits the amount of summit diplomacy India can do. If the South Block must reserve Dr. Singh for consequential diplomacy, the focus must necessarily be on strategic bilateral relationships rather than multilateral talk-shops.

The one bilateral destination that should be at the top of Dr. Singh’s itinerary is Riyadh. After the Saudi King Abdullah visited Delhi in January 2006, all efforts to organise a return visit for Dr. Singh came to naught. Engaging Saudi Arabia holds the key to many important Indian political objectives, none more critical than shaping the Af-Pak region. If Persia is important as a neighbour to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Arabia exerts more powerful leverage thanks to its enduring influence in Washington, growing clout in Pakistan, and the vast ideological and material resources at its command.

Recall that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only governments other than Pakistan to recognise Taliban rule during the 1990s. In the 1980s the Saudis helped construct the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

At the current juncture, too, the Saudis are critical for the political outcomes in the Af-Pak region. Beginning a strategic conversation and finding a common ground with the House of Saud might be far more important for Dr. Singh than the rhetorical flourishes at Yekaterinburg.

Ludhiana School

If you think Ludhiana and high politics are mutually exclusive, think again. Historians of the Great Game tell you that in the early decades of the 19th century, the Ludhiana Residency was the Raj’s principal observation post for Punjab and Afghanistan and home to some inspired strategic thinking. The officers of the Raj at Ludhiana developed a set of theses about the frontier that eventually came to be known as the Punjab School. They ran a prolonged argument with the Bombay Presidency on how Calcutta should secure India’s north-western borderlands.

The former eventually became the ‘close-border’ school calling for a defence of British India on the Indus while the latter turned into the ‘forward school’ demanding power-play way beyond the Indus.

If Bombay was focused on Persia, Ludhiana concentrated on the kingdoms run by the Sikhs and Pashtuns. The Ludhiana school’s preoccupation was with the dynamic tension between Lahore and Kabul. Some things obviously don’t change in the Great Game. The success of Delhi’s own Af-Pak policy might depend on thinking creatively about balancing Lahore and Kabul.

The writer is a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore