Opinion Snakes and charmers

Although she was careful not to refer to anti-India terror groups on Pakistani soil like the Lashkar-e-Toiba,Delhi had no problem relating to Clinton’s metaphor on snakes and cross-border terrorism.

Clinton warned the Pakistan army that if it does not go after the snakes,the US might have to do it unilaterally,even if that involves sending its troops into Pakistan’s tribal territory.

The army chief,General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani,in turn,reminded Washington that Pakistan is a nuclear power and that the US should think ten times before it tried an Iraq or Afghanistan in his country.

The war of words between the United States and Pakistan seemed dangerous enough to provoke India into calling for a dialogue between the two friendly powers to sort things out peacefully across the table.

India’s gratuitous advice was unnecessary; for Washington and Rawalpindi have been talking non-stop despite the intense public posturing in both since American forces raided and killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad last May.

India’s real problem is not about the argument between Washington and Rawalpindi degenerating into a firefight. What must concern Delhi,instead,is the possibility of a deal between the US and General Kayani that will result in the deliberate diminishing of Afghanistan’s national sovereignty.

The likelihood of such an understanding appeared to have increased by the time Clinton left Pakistan last week. In her own words,the US and Pakistan are 90 to 95 per cent in agreement on how to proceed in Afghanistan.

That brings us back to the snake metaphor. Clinton seems to have accepted,for the moment at least,the promise of Rawalpindi’s snake charmers to defang their babies,presumably in return for some major political concessions on the future of Afghanistan.

In the coming days and weeks,Clinton hinted that Washington and Rawalpindi might work out a sequence of steps,including a possible ceasefire that would set the stage for a peace process on Pakistan’s terms.

It has become difficult to deny that a war-weary Obama administration is facing a strong temptation to cede ground to Pakistan in order to win a peace of sorts in Afghanistan. Washington’s tough talk over the last few weeks appears to be dissolving into a series of concessions to the Pakistan army.

Washington appears to have convinced itself that it does not have too many levers to compel the Pakistan army to change its behaviour in Afghanistan. Once General Kayani called the Obama administration’s bluff,Washington appears to have returned to a more conciliatory approach.

As she left Pakistan,Clinton toned down the talk of unilateral American military action against the Haqqani network. She also has dropped the demand on the Pakistan army to launch military operations against the Haqqani network. Instead,she said,the “squeezing” of the Haqqani network could involve cutting of its funds and logistical support.

Walking back from the earlier charges that the Haqqani network is a “veritable arm” of the ISI,Clinton found a way to explain Rawalpindi’s behaviour. She accepted the Pakistani argument that it is normal for intelligence networks to cultivate such relationships.

Above all,Clinton appears to have conceded that the Haqqanis have a place in the political future of Afghanistan and is now betting that the ISI will deliver the militant network to the negotiating table.

Whether Pakistan is willing and capable of delivering the Haqqanis and the Taliban to the negotiating table or not,one big idea appears to be gaining ground in Washington.

It is the proposition that Pakistan’s concerns in Afghanistan must be met in one form or another for any stability in the region. The Pakistan army has apparently made a number of demands. These include giving its “snakes” a big role in the future political arrangements in Afghanistan.

Rawalpindi has also argued against building a large Afghan national army,by saying that Kabul will never have the financial resources to sustain it. It has also warned that a large Afghan armed force will eventually disintegrate into militias that pose a threat to all.

Pakistan’s objections to India’s presence and role in Afghanistan are well known. Reports from Washington say that Rawalpindi has been furious with the US reluctance to oppose the recent strategic partnership agreement between Delhi and Kabul.

It is not clear at this stage how many of these demands the US will meet in its effort to win General Kayani’s support in Afghanistan. The next few weeks are likely to reveal the broad outline of a new understanding on Afghanistan between Washington and Rawalpindi.

But any agreement that undermines Afghanistan’s sovereignty by recognising a special role for Pakistan will not be acceptable to non-Pashtun ethnic groups and other regional actors.

The idea that Pakistan’s genuine concerns in Afghanistan must be met is in itself unexceptionable. But any US suggestion that Kabul’s sovereignty must be truncated to protect Pakistan’s interests is an outrage against the Afghan nation.

Delhi must reject this proposition on the basis of principle as well as national interest. With a decisive phase in Afghanistan at hand,India must do all it can to preserve Kabul’s territorial integrity and independence and offer more reasonable alternatives to regional stability.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi
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