“There will be people who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high-end offence and defence, I can do any lesser kind of operations,’ “ he said. “What we have found through seven years is that is not the case.”

Some steps to improve the Army’s abilities in these areas are already under way, he asserted. By way of example, changes are being made in the way combat engineers are assigned, to give commanders more flexibility.

Some of the Army’s up-and-coming officers, however, say much more needs to be done, including attracting more officers to disciplines that the manual says are so necessary, like advising foreign security forces and assisting with civil affairs.

“The parts of the Army closest to the battlefield have adapted, including tactics and doctrine,” said Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, who wrote a widely circulated article criticizing how the generals fought the Iraq war. “However, the institutional Army, to include our organisational designs and our personnel system, is essentially the same as before 9/11.”

He added: “The most important tasks we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan are building host-nation institutions. We need to attract the very best officers into these specialties to be successful at these tasks.”