Third, neither New Delhi nor Islamabad had the strength to fully sustain the third frontier of British India. While New Delhi quickly reconciled itself to the rise of a powerful new state in China that gained control over Tibet, Pakistan’s foreign policy has tied itself into knots by pursuing the “strategic depth” strategy inside Afghanistan.

Fourth, there is the inability of the new states to offer an honourable integration to the people on their frontiers. The Baloch who enjoyed a relatively loose association with British India were not eager to disappear into a new Pakistan. The Pashtuns divided by the Durand Line remained anxious about their relative power position in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tibetan quest for autonomy in China has refused to go away. In Myanmar, the ethnic minorities have rarely stopped their prolonged war against Yangon.

What can India do to promote solutions to the intractable problems on its borders? For one, it must stand firm in its principled opposition to the break-up of the existing states. It is the fear of disintegration that has driven the Chinese communists and Burmese generals to cracking down so hard ons the recent political protests.

Two, while ruling out the creation of new states, India must encourage its neighbours — Myanmar, China, Nepal and Pakistan — to move steadily towards granting genuine autonomy to ethnic minorities. India’s relative success in managing diversity and mitigating the many insurgencies it had to confront is rooted in its federalism. The Tibetan revolt has underlined the reality that no amount of economic growth can overcome the minorities’ quest for cultural autonomy and political dignity.

... contd.