First, let us look at corruption amongst the poorest; for whom access to government programmes is a matter of survival. A study on corruption levels in Orissa revealed that a poor citizen had to go through 11 stages of bureaucratic and political hurdles and pay bribes of over Rs 2,000 to access a death compensation of Rs 75,000. For someone living on less than Rs 40 a day, Rs 2,000 is a significant amount of money, but this is paid out of necessity. Collective action amongst the poorest is difficult because of the very vulnerabilities that make coercion possible — they are unaware of their rights and often locked in exploitative patron-client relationships.

Let’s now turn to corruption amongst the relatively better off — the elites in rural societies. For them the state is a means of fulfilling greater aspirations of social mobility, and corruption is part of the deal. This needs to be understood in the context of the political economy of the Indian state. As many have argued, the statist model of development created numerous spaces for patronage dispensation in Indian polity. The resulting nexus between the politician, bureaucrat and local elites has meant that the state and its apparatus are treated not so much as a space for generating public goods, but for the accumulation of private wealth. And therefore, for them collusiveness in corruption is a means to an end, and corruption is legitimised as part of a larger system that offers economic and social opportunities. Legitimacy precludes any possibility of collective action.

... contd.