While it is premature to ascertain who was responsible for these blasts, there is little doubt that terrorists are once again sensing a political vacuum and lack of resolve in the top echelons of government. A proper response to terrorism requires a dual strategy. On the hand, the state has to send a clear message that terrorism is not acceptable. But this is a message the state has to send in the architecture of its security policies, in the assiduousness and precision with which it pursues perpetrators. There is something almost anaemic about the way the government condemns terrorism.

The NDA government’s anti-terrorism policy was a combination of formalism, draconian powers to the state and political overreaction. Its legislative interventions like Pota made it susceptible to the charge that it violated due process and civil liberties that a civilized state should protect at all costs. Concomitantly, its political rhetoric was less interested in targeting terrorists but more in milking terrorism to create an atmosphere of anxiety that could be exploited for political gain. The NDA’s record was more legal formalism than actual success in combating terrorism. The UPA’s policy seems to simply reverse the strategy: do away with all strong signals to terrorists and, for fear of political overreaction, prevent tough scrutiny of groups that may be out to do harm. The tragedy is that either way members of the minority community are set up as objects of a potential political backlash. In the NDA’s case they become direct targets; in UPA’s case, if the state is is seen as soft on terror it cultivates conditions for a future backlash.

We of course know that there is no such thing as a spontaneous backlash: organised groups and the state prepare propitious conditions for exploiting violence. The silver lining has been that since Gujarat, and with the coming to power of the UPA, the state at least has not connived in such a backlash. But it would be premature to conclude that the politics of backlash will not come to haunt us. Clearly, terrorists would have been emboldened by the events in Bhiwandi, and the image of a Shiv Sena ready to go on a rampage at the slightest affront. The potential of a volatile communal politics has not receded. Therefore it is all the more important that the state is seen to be intelligently strong on terrorism. On terrorism we now need a discourse that can detach the issue from the majority-minority distinction; that distinction should simply become irrelevant in framing our response.

The second leg of any anti-terrorism strategy has to be political. But it would be foolish for any state to assume that political and security strategies can substitute for each other: you need both. We also have to recognise that, by and large, the terrorism we faced had its roots in the geo-strategic politics of the region. But the one thing that may be changing is India is now more likely to be an object of global jihad, not just the homegrown variety inspired by Pakistan or Kashmir or alienation caused by the Gujarat riots.

India has always been an object of global jihad, but its positioning in the international system is now more likely to make cities like Mumbai targets in the way Madrid and London were. This limits our political options. But even within South Asia, the options are limited. The PM was absolutely correct to take political initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan and Kashmir. But there is a palpable sense that both initiatives have reached a plateau. Both processes are stalling for three reasons. One, General Musharraf’s capacity to reorient anti-India elements within his state structure is still in doubt. Second, it is not entirely clear that India can make any significant enough concession to appease the constituencies inside Kashmir or Pakistan without compromising its core interests.

What makes the issue even more difficult to discuss is that nobody quite believes that this PM, with all his good intentions, has the power and clout to bring about any significant changes in policy. There is a palpable sense of political vacuum and let us just hope that the fortitude and patience of Indian citizens provides enough resistance to terrorist designs. But we are in this awkward situation of the government trying to engage in a political strategy it does not have the power to execute, and a security strategy it cannot have for fear of political consequences.

The writer is president , Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi