We of course know that there is no such thing as a spontaneous backlash: organised groups and the state prepare propitious conditions for exploiting violence. The silver lining has been that since Gujarat, and with the coming to power of the UPA, the state at least has not connived in such a backlash. But it would be premature to conclude that the politics of backlash will not come to haunt us. Clearly, terrorists would have been emboldened by the events in Bhiwandi, and the image of a Shiv Sena ready to go on a rampage at the slightest affront. The potential of a volatile communal politics has not receded. Therefore it is all the more important that the state is seen to be intelligently strong on terrorism. On terrorism we now need a discourse that can detach the issue from the majority-minority distinction; that distinction should simply become irrelevant in framing our response.

The second leg of any anti-terrorism strategy has to be political. But it would be foolish for any state to assume that political and security strategies can substitute for each other: you need both. We also have to recognise that, by and large, the terrorism we faced had its roots in the geo-strategic politics of the region. But the one thing that may be changing is India is now more likely to be an object of global jihad, not just the homegrown variety inspired by Pakistan or Kashmir or alienation caused by the Gujarat riots.

India has always been an object of global jihad, but its positioning in the international system is now more likely to make cities like Mumbai targets in the way Madrid and London were. This limits our political options. But even within South Asia, the options are limited. The PM was absolutely correct to take political initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan and Kashmir. But there is a palpable sense that both initiatives have reached a plateau. Both processes are stalling for three reasons. One, General Musharraf’s capacity to reorient anti-India elements within his state structure is still in doubt. Second, it is not entirely clear that India can make any significant enough concession to appease the constituencies inside Kashmir or Pakistan without compromising its core interests.

... contd.