In the last sixty years, the building of the state structure was nearly complete, in most other regions and at the Centre. The first task was value addition to the inherited colonial administration; apart from reinventing the chain of command for development administration, parallel to the general administration. It also entailedthe creation of new institutions to serve the development agenda. Such strengthening of the state and its consequent economic development would have led to a growing market structure, which could later take care of development needs, even when the state opted to retreat. In this context, one should understand that the shifting of Tata’s NANO plant from West Bengal to Gujarat indicated the generic strength of the former ‘ryotwari settled’ state structure along with its vibrant market. This is not so much due to Modi’s negotiating skills, but Gujarat’s financially powerful provincial state structure, built by successive chief ministers.

Nevertheless, all components of state-building were not uniformly achieved even in the successful provinces. Nehru became the national icon of such efforts, because he added the politics of inclusion and ideology to a techno-managerial thrust. This model was followed by several provinces, spearheaded in the south by K. Kamraj, in the north by Pratap Singh Kairon, in the west by Y.B. Chavan and in the east by Biju Patnaik. The provinces which built new state structures in the early years after Independence, are now in the forefront of development. Unfortunately, in Bihar, the agenda was never taken up. Being a ‘permanent settled’ region, where zamindars ruled the roost, the limited revenue generation stunted the state-building effort.

It is extremely ironic that despite being a failed state, the process of electoral democratisation in Bihar has continued unabated under socialist, communist, radical and social justice movements. This has resulted in completely changing the power structure. Wider democratisation aided the collapse of the state structure. Unfortunately, this was ignored by elites of all complexions. The ‘traditional elite’ felt that an enabled state structure would threaten not only their feudal interest but also ultimately their political hegemony. In contrast, the ‘cockney elite’, who dethroned the traditional elite, could not understand the importance of state instruments for inclusive development. The social base of the ‘cockney’ elite being outside the market structure, and their production being generally wedded to self-consumption, they could not understand the importance of a facilitating state to critical agricultural inputs like seed, fertiliser and irrigation.

In the last three years, for the first time since Independence, there is a concerted effort to establish the state’s authority. The increased conviction and decreased crime rates clearly indicate this shift. Over and above this, several state-sponsored institutions are now being established in Bihar. Elsewhere, such institutions have been established by either the government or the corporate sector. Even though massive administrative reform has been attempted in Bihar, the architecture of governance is not techno-managerial and inclusion is institutionalised. Positive discrimination in panchayati raj institutions for lower backward castes, Dalits and women has consolidated social justice and political inclusion. Such inclusion will widen when the Bihar state election authority — an institution unique in the country — will conduct elections for managing committees of cooperative societies, education and health committees, and other societies as decided by the government. Out of these, the cooperative society is critical, facilitating supply of credit and input to farmers. But Bihar was the exception, where the green revolution stalled because of the staggering scale of leakage and rent-seeking by the co-operative mafia. The co-operative mafia’s strength is indicated by the fact that, in spite of Laloo Prasad Yadav’s long reign, when the elections of the superceded co-operative bodies were held in 2002-3 after almost two decades, the same people were elected again : the force of social justice escaped these bodies. Now, with the amended Bihar Co-operative Society Act (2008), elections in these bodies will not be held with a captive constituency of limited members. To ensure enduring change, the government has launched a massive membership drive. There will be a primary agricultural credit society in each panchayat and the election authority will conduct its election. In the third year of Nitish Kumar’s term, economic inclusion is also in the offing — which may fundamentally change grassroots power equations.

The writer is member secretary, Asian Development Research Institute