In his interaction with the Council on Foreign Relations, he again pointed out that “US law states that while we can promise reprocessing consent rights, we have to negotiate a subsequent agreement. We will do that and Congress will have the right to review that agreement”.

That is, we will set up a dedicated facility under IAEA safeguards. Arrangements and procedures for using it will have to be agreed upon with the US which shall be bound by its national laws, policies, licence requirements. This new agreement, when it is made, shall be submitted to the US Congress for approval. Hence, while here we have a step forward, we have to see where it lands us by the time the sequence is completed even in regard to this one step.

The rationalisation

The rationalisation for the deal that as typical as it would be consequential if only it were true was first put out in the initial stages by K. Subramaniam. He wrote, “Given India’s uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible nuclear arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India’s advantage to categorise as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons-grade plutonium production.”

Such rationalisations became an inconvenience for those who were lobbying for the deal in Washington: see, Senators like Senator Dorgan pointed out, Indians will use what they get from us to increase their weapons arsenal. Little was left of it after the Hyde Act was passed--the possibility was firmly scotched. And, therefore, I was doubly surprised to hear the rationalisation in a briefing from one of the highest persons: this Agreement, he emphasised more than once, gives ‘greater manoeuverability’ in regard to our weapons programme: we can use the imported uranium for electricity generation; this will leave our own uranium entirely free for our weapons programme.

... contd.