Instead, they have harped on inconsequential prestige issues. One relates to prohibition on export of US enrichment and reprocessing technologies. But India has already developed both reprocessing and enrichment technologies indigenously and we are not even shopping for them. Should we worry if they refuse to sell us things we are not even seeking?

Another issue relates to safeguards. The legislation provides for ‘fall-back safeguards’, that is, should the IAEA be unable to conduct its safeguards, some alternate provisions should be made for ensuring safeguards on technology that the US has transferred to India. The critics have not stated why this should be an issue considering that these safeguards are only on facilities that have been declared as civilian by India, and in no way affects India’s nuclear military facilities.

The only consequential item in these objections is the issue of further nuclear tests, which will end nuclear cooperation and require India to return the materials it received from the US. But note that once the NSG rules are modified, France and Russia are likely to have a greater role in the Indian nuclear power programme than the US and neither are likely to pull out, which itself should be a deterrent to the US pulling out.

The government needs to continue emphasising that India retains its options to test. It is essential to be careful about international politics, but these paranoids have no real enemies.

The writer is associate professor of international politics, JNU, New Delhi