The dossier, prepared meticulously over the past month, builds a strong case that aims to nail the fact that the planning, execution and control of this terror operation was done from Pakistan and hence, investigations be launched to arrest the guilty and hand them over to India.

While much of the information has been available in public domain, this is the first government document that puts down the sequence of what happened and reveals certain fresh details.

Consider these:

Training: Ajmal Amir Kasab, according to the dossier, has revealed that 32 terrorists were trained initially, of which 13 were selected. Of these, six were sent elsewhere and three new members — including the eventual leader of the operation Ismail Khan — joined later. Details of the plan were told to the 10-member team in mid-September after which the group remained in isolation near Karachi till their launch. During this time, they were trained to use GPS instruments, a launch dinghy and ways to deal with sea sickness. Kasab, the dossier says, has specifically identified Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi as someone who was closely monitoring the training. Other names given by him are Abu Hamza, Kaahfa and Yousuf alias Muzammil.

Karachi to Mumbai: The team set off at about 8 am on November 22 in a small boat, it has emerged from GPS data and Kasab’s interrogation. About 40 minutes later, they were moved to a larger boat called Al-Hussaini that Kasab has said belonged to Lakhvi, the LeT commander. A day later, on November 23, at about 3 pm, the MV Kuber docked next to Al-Hussaini and the team changed boats, killed four of the five-member crew there and retained the boat captain to help navigate the 550 nautical miles to Mumbai. The vessel maintained a safe 60-80 km distance from the Indian coast and followed four positions marked out on the GPS as JALA 1, JALA 2, JALA 3, JALA 4 (Budhwar Park). They reached Mumbai at 4 pm on November 26 and waited 4 nautical miles off the coast till dark. Team leader Ismail Khan contacted their Pak handler who instructed him to kill Kuber captain Amar Sinh Solanki. Then they boarded an inflatable dinghy, and using a GPS instrument, reached Budhwar Park an hour and 15 minutes later. Instructions were to throw away the satellite phone, but they failed to do so and left it in the dinghy.

Contacts with Pak handlers: The evidence which India has shared states that Ismail Khan, the team leader, tried contacting Pakistan on the phone even as he and Kasab were on the move. Throughout the attacks, India has said, Pakistani handlers were informing terrorists of developments by monitoring Indian news channels. Specific orders were given once to “set fire in the hotel” and take hostage “some important government functionary”. India has said it has evidence of handlers telling terrorists about the “impending assault” by the NSG from the roof. The controller in Pakistan once directed the terrorist that he wanted to hear screams of dying hostages. And terrorists were “specifically told that killing Jews would spoil India’s relations with Israel”.

Other evidence: The 9 mm pistols recovered from almost all terrorists bore the marking ‘Diamond Nedi Frontier Arms Company, Pehshawar’ while grenades had Arges marking as recovered also when Parliament was attacked in December 2001. Arges, an Austrian company, has stopped manufacturing grenades but has given franchise to Pakistan Ordinance Factory. GPS phones with European SIM cards have also been recovered from all the three sites besides Thuraya SIM cards. All these details have been shared in the form of photographs in the dossier.

Besides this, there are lots of other evidence showing links to Pakistan that have been highlighted in the dossier. These include:

• Roster recovered from MV Kuber was maintained in Urdu and shows terrorists performing guard duties.

• Photographs of detergent powder of Pak-make, diesel container and a matchbox with ‘made-in Pakistan’ labels.

• Photographs of wheat flour sack from Qamar Food Products, Shah Faisal Town, Karachi.

• Medicam dental cream, Touch Me Shaving cream, a Mountain Dew soft drink bottle with all Pakistan labels.

India also briefed the envoys of the various efforts India has made in the past trying to draw Pakistan’s attention through various dialogue fora to cooperate on terror but received no encouragement.

The dossier also points to the inconsistencies in Pakistan’s responses after the attacks, citing the turnaround on sending DG ISI, the hoax call episode, incongruent statements on Maulana Masood Azhar and Kasab’s identity.

Kasab has revealed that 13 were selected from the 32 who underwent training. Of these, six were sent elsewhere and three new members — including the leader of the operation, Ismail Khan — joined later. Details of the plan were told to the 10-member team in mid-September, they remained in isolation near Karachi till their launch on November 22.

Throughout the attacks, India has said, Pakistani handlers were informing terrorists of developments by monitoring Indian news channels. There is evidence of handlers telling terrorists about the “impending assault” by the NSG from the roof of Nariman House. The controller in Pakistan once directed the terrorist that he wanted to hear screams of dying hostages.

The face-off: Past 24 hours

• “This material is linked to elements in Pakistan. It is our expectation that the government of Pakistan will promptly undertake further investigations in Pakistan and share the results with us so as to bring the perpetrators to justice.”

— MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

• “Pakistan is carrying out its own investigations and is determined to uncover the full facts pertaining to the Mumbai terrorist attacks... It will evaluate the information provided by India... Pakistan and India must cooperate... with a view to gathering evidence that is legally scrutable”.

— Pak Foreign Secretary SALMAN BASHIR

• “We had very good talks with the Foreign Secretary... We got a full briefing from our (Indian) colleagues. We would study them of course... We would see... My visit here is to encourage both sides to find a way out through dialogue and consultation... it is the best way.”

— China’s special envoy HE YAFEI

• “The FBI will pursue the evidence gathered (in Mumbai) and they will eventually take the evidence to Pakistan... This is what the FBI is doing and will do in coming weeks and months... The United States will pursue the investigation to its conclusion.”

— US ambassador DAVID C. MULFORD

• “Such material cannot be treated as ample proof... under any penal code anywhere in the world, including India or Pakistan... Indian authorities should produce credible evidence to establish Iman’s identity... Some Indian papers have reported that he is actually an Indian national...

— Unnamed Pakistani official, quoted in The News, running down captured terrorist Ajmal Ameer Kasab’s letter to Pakistan seeking consular help in Indian custody

• “Pakistan (is making) persistent efforts to defuse tensions with India... (My) Government is committed to take action against any Pakistani national in case credible evidence is provided.”

— Pak PM YOUSUF RAZA GILANI to US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher