Now that the debate is on, it is important to revisit the subject of nuclear testing.

The 1974 test, the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) was of a rudimentary fission bomb. The claimed yield was about 10 to 12 kilotons. US estimates suggest the yield was around 4-6 Kt. The broadly accepted view is that the yield was below the expected 12-15 Kt. Debate on the subject had been brushed aside by the DAE scientists. But they did acknowledge that the size to yield ratio needed to be bettered and the device was not fit for use as a warhead.

Since 1982 the DAE and the DRDO had been working together in designing a nuclear device that required improvements in the symmetry (simultaneity) and its ruggedisation so that it could withstand the stresses of aircraft delivery or missile launch.

Twenty-four years later we tested again, this time in two stages. Three devices were detonated on May 11 1998 followed by another two, two days later.

The tests were meant to give our scientists ‘valuable data base — useful in the design of nuclear weapons — of different yields, different applications and different delivery systems’. They were directed to cover the full spectrum of nuclear weapons. The May 11 tests included fission and fusion (hydrogen/ thermonuclear) bombs and a sub kiloton (miniature) nuclear explosive device. The May 13 tests experimented with two more sub kiloton devices aimed at generating data for ‘improved computer simulation’.

This time too, the yields were disputed as also the success of the thermonuclear or fusion device. While from within the DRDO/ DAE establishment some differences did surface on the claimed results, outside of it, both from within India and abroad there is a strong body of opinion which believes that we may have been successful with the fission bombs, but the thermonuclear device had glitches. According to Perkovich, the US intelligence community concluded that the thermonuclear bomb was a two-stage device in which the second stage failed to ignite.

However, the country decided to withhold further testing. Many analysts hold the view that there were two reasons — both questionable — for the self-imposed ban on testing: one, to soften international reaction and two, because our scientists claimed the tests had achieved the objectives. They probably optimistically believed that whatever else needed to be learnt, could be done through computer simulation.

The fundamental question that ought to be objectively addressed is whether on the basis of the tests conducted we are capable of designing both fission and fusion warheads required for our desired strategic nuclear weapons capability. This was an extremely important question at the time when we unilaterally imposed a moratorium on further testing. It remains equally important today as we debate the nuclear deal.

Delving into the first issue of managing international reaction at that time would now be only of academic interest. But the second reason — of the capability to design and construct appropriate fission and fusion bombs — is vitally important. If we have the know-how to manufacture the entire range of nuclear weapons that we need, then how do we justify the uproar over testing.

The nuclear weapons capability of the five nuclear weapon states (P-5) has been stable for over two decades now. Apart from some esoteric experiments reportedly being pursued by the US, the assessment currently is that the existing warhead capability of the nuclear weapon powers (leaving aside Pakistan and North Korea) is unlikely to be seriously altered. If the global nuclear order is going to remain static in technology and capability and we have acquired the requisite expertise after the 1998 tests, then why are we worried about the Hyde Act clauses since we don’t really need to test?

The problem arises only if there are doubts about our capability. If these exist, then the necessity to test again has been there since May 1998. The only determinant is our scientists’ readinesses to repeat the tests, after finding solutions to the malfunctions that were noted.

Many of us believe that additional tests are inescapable for the capability that we ought to be aspiring for. A study of the record of testing by other nuclear weapon states would be revealing. Admittedly computer simulation techniques have made rapid advances but they still have their limitations.

It may therefore be argued that if our capability is not to be Pakistan-centric and if we were to understand the dynamics of global ‘structural realism’ our nuclear weapons capability must include both fission and fusion bombs with optimum weight/size to yield ratios in adequate numbers. And therefore to have an appropriate strategic nuclear deterrent in place we need to test unless the US or one of the other P-5 nations transfer the necessary technological know-how to us.

Given this context, the contention that the need to test again is contingent on what might happen in the future is specious. It is the current imbalance that mandates urgent attention.

As the political fires rage and calculators are furiously punched for answers to questions of coalition arithmetic, India must not lose sight of the bigger goal. Where do we as a nation want to be by 2020-2050 and what type of strategic nuclear weapons capability do we need to conform to the status we aspire for? From this vision must emerge the milestones that we will traverse.

The writer is former director general, artillery