The nuclear weapons capability of the five nuclear weapon states (P-5) has been stable for over two decades now. Apart from some esoteric experiments reportedly being pursued by the US, the assessment currently is that the existing warhead capability of the nuclear weapon powers (leaving aside Pakistan and North Korea) is unlikely to be seriously altered. If the global nuclear order is going to remain static in technology and capability and we have acquired the requisite expertise after the 1998 tests, then why are we worried about the Hyde Act clauses since we don’t really need to test?

The problem arises only if there are doubts about our capability. If these exist, then the necessity to test again has been there since May 1998. The only determinant is our scientists’ readinesses to repeat the tests, after finding solutions to the malfunctions that were noted.

Many of us believe that additional tests are inescapable for the capability that we ought to be aspiring for. A study of the record of testing by other nuclear weapon states would be revealing. Admittedly computer simulation techniques have made rapid advances but they still have their limitations.

It may therefore be argued that if our capability is not to be Pakistan-centric and if we were to understand the dynamics of global ‘structural realism’ our nuclear weapons capability must include both fission and fusion bombs with optimum weight/size to yield ratios in adequate numbers. And therefore to have an appropriate strategic nuclear deterrent in place we need to test unless the US or one of the other P-5 nations transfer the necessary technological know-how to us.

... contd.