So the revisionist version of the crisis is plainly inaccurate, but is it really dangerous? Yes, if it distorts the way new rules are drawn up to regulate banks. It would be a disaster if regulators adopted a two-tier approach, judging that those banks able to avoid or repay quickly state capital early had more or less vindicated their business models, and that only those unable to pay up required closer oversight. Although Barack Obama has said repayment does not imply "permission for future misdeeds", banks with government stakes seem likely to be subject to different rules on executive pay.

If anything, regulators should focus not on the tardiest payers, but on those banks that are too important to fail. And the main bits of the reforms needed - more liquidity and capital, less proprietary risk-taking and better incentives - should be applied firmly and consistently to all lenders. It was the entire banking system, not a few individual firms, that failed. It is the entire system that must now be fixed.

© The Economist Newspaper Limited 2009