Despite the commitment of Manmohan Singh and President Hu Jintao to keep the India-China relationship on track, there is a widespread acknowledgment in both countries that the relationship is becoming increasingly contentious. The border issue is unlikely to yield any significant breakthrough in the near future. The economic relationship is also fraught: the rising number of anti-dumping cases, charges of a Chinese conspiracy to falsely implicate Indian companies in a fake drugs scam and China’s attempts to block a loan to India at the ADB are adding fuel to anxieties in some quarters in India about how to deal with China. The level of vitriol in the public sphere in both countries is reaching unprecedented levels. In India great concern has been expressed about an editorial in the People’s Daily castigating India, and arguments emanating from a Chinese think tank about strategies to dismember it. The trust deficit seems to be widening.

It is important to contextualise public discourse. Even in China opinion is not as monolithic as we assume, and it is important not to over-interpret articles. Most China observers agree on three propositions. There seems to be a more general hardening of China’s posture towards most other powers in recent months, whether it is Canada or the European Union or other Asia-Pacific nations. India is not an exception to this trend. Second, a more hardline external posture is directly related to China’s sense of internal vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, the world probably has less to fear from a strong China than a weak one. China had witnessed, over the years, a relative degree of internal intellectual openness. There are signs that there might be greater clamping down on internal debate. The events in Xinjiang and Tibet have created a greater sense of vulnerability. It is very important for the self-identity of Chinese elites that the trigger for these events is always projected as emanating from abroad. There is often a belief that Xinjiang, Tibet, in addition to Taiwan, will be fishing ground for anti-China foreign powers. For all the immense power China has, including leverage over the United States, it still has not got over the idea that it remains a target for outsiders. Third, there is in all likelihood also more intra-elite uncertainty about the direction China should take. Chinese policy may not be as nimble as we often assume; certainly on Af-Pak and North Korea it is more likely that the Chinese persist with the status quo because they don’t know quite how to move, rather than because they have a supremely well-thought-out policy. Its hardline may be a default way of coping with hesitation.

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