It is important to contextualise public discourse. Even in China opinion is not as monolithic as we assume, and it is important not to over-interpret articles. Most China observers agree on three propositions. There seems to be a more general hardening of China’s posture towards most other powers in recent months, whether it is Canada or the European Union or other Asia-Pacific nations. India is not an exception to this trend. Second, a more hardline external posture is directly related to China’s sense of internal vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, the world probably has less to fear from a strong China than a weak one. China had witnessed, over the years, a relative degree of internal intellectual openness. There are signs that there might be greater clamping down on internal debate. The events in Xinjiang and Tibet have created a greater sense of vulnerability. It is very important for the self-identity of Chinese elites that the trigger for these events is always projected as emanating from abroad. There is often a belief that Xinjiang, Tibet, in addition to Taiwan, will be fishing ground for anti-China foreign powers. For all the immense power China has, including leverage over the United States, it still has not got over the idea that it remains a target for outsiders. Third, there is in all likelihood also more intra-elite uncertainty about the direction China should take. Chinese policy may not be as nimble as we often assume; certainly on Af-Pak and North Korea it is more likely that the Chinese persist with the status quo because they don’t know quite how to move, rather than because they have a supremely well-thought-out policy. Its hardline may be a default way of coping with hesitation.

But in the case of India there are three other complicating factors. The first, perhaps minor, one is simply that there is no incentive for China to settle the border issue quickly. But in part this is fuelled by a perception that the domestic political economy constraints on both sides will not allow for an easy settlement. Arguably, the Tibet issue is only likely to become more potent in coming months. As an aside, it will be interesting to see if President Obama grants the Dalai Lama an audience and what the consequences of that might be. China is certainly not going to give up any claims in a hurry.

But there is also a perception in China that no Indian leadership will be able to politically deliver on a border settlement. The dominant narrative of China as an aggressor in 1962 is still so ingrained that when it comes down to the wire no Indian government will be able to make a credible offer.

The second is that the Indo-US relationship is perceived to be explicitly some part of a design to contain China. India can argue with some justification that the China-US relationship is much closer and more consequential, that improving relations with the US and China is not a zero sum game, and the possibility of serious Sino-US conflict is remote. But this argument does not seem as compelling to many Chinese for two reasons. First, many of them rate the possibility of Sino-US tensions increasing higher than what Indians normally do. So whose side you are on matters to them. Second, while they are happy with bilateral relationships, placing the relationship with the US in a broader quadrilateral arrangement involving Japan and Australia has not exactly gone down well. It has fed into their encirclement syndrome.

But the final and perhaps most important issue is this. The simple fact of the matter is that India’s success poses a challenge for the Chinese regime. So far it was easy to sustain an argument that if you are a large developing democracy, you will end up in a pathetic position like India. India still has huge challenges, but there is a sense in which it now genuinely offers a different path to development. The interesting thing about the two pieces of anti-India writing quoted in the Indian press was not their belligerence. It was the fact that they spend so much time impugning the India story — India is economically weak and backward, it cannot cope with diversity, it is artificial and so forth. The message was more to throw cold water on the Indian model, than belligerence in a classical security sense. In a strange way this confirms what some Chinese academics have been saying informally: India may pose a threat to some sections of the regime, not by its power but by its success.

The India-China relationship was always complicated. Here are two civilisations trying to get all the trappings of a nation state, each dealing in its own way with colonial legacies on borders, and with little domestic room for manoeuvre. On top of that there is an overlay of differing perceptions of geo-politics, in part made more complicated by a China that is more edgy in the last few months than ever before. A robust economic relationship was supposed to be an antidote to these tensions. But that has its limitations. Although Indian industry is more confident, the fear of Chinese over-capacity and pricing mechanisms remains. Cooperation in other multilateral forums, while it has immense possibilities, will be hampered by bilateral suspicions. India and China’s discourses about each other are complicated, because they are tied to their complex processes of self-discovery. There is not going to be an easy way to allay the trust deficit. While vigilance is important, it is equally important to throw some cold water on the paranoia building up.

The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research, Delhi

express@expressindia.com