But the relationship remains deeply asymmetrical and contradictory in China’s favour. China’s GDP is thrice that of India, and the gap will increase progressively till at least 2025. Beijing’s defence expenditure officially pegged at US $45 billion is almost twice what Delhi allocates, though most China-watchers place the Chinese figure closer to $60 billion. In every aspect of critical trans-border military capability barring the naval, China looms much larger. The January 2007 successful anti-satellite missile test by the PLA sent out a strong signal about the texture of China’s military modernisation drive. India remains several notches behind China in composite strategic trans-border military capability, which includes nuclear weapons, missiles, satellites and the ability to move sizeable troops. China’s growing politico-military influence in the South Asian region and the contrast with India adds to the asymmetry. Furthermore, Beijing’s reticence to support the India-US nuclear agreement heightens Delhi’s discomfiture.

India’s relative subaltern status leads to many deep, and not invalid, anxieties about China’s intent, and this is further exacerbated by the trajectory of the Beijing-Islamabad relationship. Since the 1971 war for Bangladesh, Beijing has cultivated Pakistan as a fetter to contain India and abetted the covert Pakistani quest for nuclear weapons. North Korea was part of the loop and Beijing midwived this transaction.

Beijing’s deeper intent at the time was to encourage WMD proliferation knowing that this was enabling the Pak military to intensify its terrorism campaign against India. Since Kargil of May 1999 and the enormity of 9/11, there appears to be a tentative rethink of China’s proliferation policies — for, both North Korea and Pakistan detract from Beijing’s aspiration to be a responsible global power.

... contd.