However, a closer look at what is happening on Pakistan’s western front would reveal a worrying gap between the apparent and the real. Some battles may have easily been won but winning this war may turn out to be frightfully difficult and extremely painful.

Take a look at the numbers for internal displacement. The 1971 figures (population-to-refugee ratio) that led to the creation of Bangladesh pale in comparison. Within a fortnight of the operation, the refugee figures swelled to over 2 million — almost half of the total population of the area.

Conditions in the refugee camps are appalling: shortage of water, extreme heat, poor sanitation, no schools for children and no source of income. The IDPs’ homes have been destroyed, as also their crops, due to the indiscriminate and heavy shelling by the military. The Rs 25,000 compensation being offered is woefully inadequate — and does not easily reach refugees.

What about the Taliban? Assessments indicate that the region had close to 7000 Taliban militants. The army claims to have eliminated over 1000. The rest, it is reported, have either melted into the refugee camps or have moved to the hills or to other districts, retaining their capacity to strike at will almost anywhere in Pakistan. The attacks in Lahore, Peshawar and now Islamabad confirm this.

While casualties taken by the army are reported to be less than 100, no one is really talking about civilian casualties. The numbers could be alarmingly large because of the indiscriminate bombing and the inevitable deaths and injuries due to crossfire. The repercussions of civilian deaths and injuries would be obvious to those of us who understand the complexities of counter-insurgency operations. Each such dead and wounded causes more insurgents to spring up. The conclusion is obvious: with the passage of time, the problems will get worse.

In the joint press conference with Holbrooke on June 3, President Zardari talked of the imperative for “strong and decisive” action by the Pakistan Army. It can be assumed that he was echoing America’s viewpoint and maybe even phraseology. The army’s approach too has echoes: destroy rather than defeat; as the US operated in Iraq and Afghanistan. The universally accepted principle of the “use of minimum force” was apparently totally ignored. The Pakistan military threw in everything it had: tanks, artillery, gunships, fighter aircraft, in their ground-attack role. A quote from a local 50-year-old mason sums it up: “If the government wants to control and crush the Taliban why don’t they send in ground troops? Why are they only shelling, which hurts the public most of all and creates anti-government feelings?”

In India, we have fought insurgents and militants for over 50 years; in Kashmir alone for 20 years now. Barring one exception, never have we contemplated using artillery or tanks, nor for that matter the air arm for combat. Operations have been entirely by infantry and paramilitary forces. The air force or army aviation, if used, was only for surveillance, communications and casualty evacuation. All soldiers are expected to abide by the “ten commandments” issued by HQ that stress “minimum force” and a humane approach.

The requirement for Pakistan to take “strong and decisive action” against the Taliban is indisputable. But what merits review are the “time and force” factors. The fundamentals of minimum force and the least collateral damage together with the conduct of concurrent civic action must guide the future planning of operations. Such an approach will obviously imply a slower and steadier pace of advance. But this has to be accepted.

After much hesitation and considerable persuasion, Pakistan has begun to tackle the Taliban menace. Pakistan and its army must now stay the course. The US and its allies seem to understand this. But where fatal mistakes are being made is in the approach. The Pakistan army must jettison heavy stuff like tanks, artillery and gunships. Instead, it must deploy more boots on the ground and back such action with a well-conceived plan of civic action, one that takes into account the Pashtuns in its ranks, nearly a quarter of its strength.

The basic mistake was putting too heavy a premium on the time factor. This is where the US has repeatedly gone wrong. Unless this is now recognised and redefined, they may be looking at a Pakistan-Afghanistan policy instead.

The writer was Director-General, Artillery during the Kargil War express@expressindia.com