What he did not say was that he was wily as a fox, nimble on his feet, managed the Americans astutely, extracted economic and military aid from them for his cooperation, tried to protect Pakistan’s interests to its west by differentiating between al Qaeda and the Taliban, aiding the latter surreptitiously in order to protect Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan. He played his weak hand well. He persuaded India that Pakistan was equally a victim of terrorism, reversing the entrenched Indian position on Pakistan’s complicity in promoting terrorism in India. We failed to distinguish between the source of the terrorist threat in Pakistan, which was a backlash of his policy of cooperation with the United States, and the source of Pakistan-inspired terrorism against us. He achieved the objective of not having to fight on two fronts by scaling down tensions with India.

Musharraf’s exit makes the political situation in Pakistan more uncertain in the short term. Until now the two main parties had a common “enemy” and confrontation with it required a united phalanx. With Musharraf’s exit, competition between the PML(N) and the PPP will begin in earnest. It is generally believed that if fresh elections are held, the PML(N) would improve upon its previous performance, opening the doors of the prime minister’s office to Nawaz Sharif.

Musharraf’s exit is certainly a big blow to the prestige of the Pakistan military. He acted in the name of the military, with its full backing until near the end. General Kayani, considered an enigma by many Pakistanis, is inclined to withdraw the army from the foreground so as not to further damage its reputation. But while the civil-military equation might change to some extent, any radical transformation will not occur. Policy towards India and Afghanistan will require consultation and consensus with the military. Pakistan’s nuclear policies will continue to be framed by the armed forces. The Americans would much rather rely on the military to protect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from extremists rather than untrustworthy politicians. In combating the religious extremists in the tribal areas and stemming the rise of the Taliban that so perturbs the Americans and NATO forces, the role of the military will be critical as they will be the instrument of any action. The politicians will not be able to resolve the problem through political deals. Outside pressure to take action will not let up; there is widespread consensus in Pakistan that the Americans are putting in less than needed effort themselves by way of troops and want the Pakistanis to fill in the shortfall irrespective of long-term costs for them.

... contd.