What identity cards are bicycle-purchasers going to produce?  Forget counterfeit versions of identity cards. Genuine ones like ration cards and driving licences can be obtained through agents for payment of fees. In other words, government-delivered systems of such cards are ridden with corruption and don’t help the cause of security. What happened to the biometric national identity card that now goes by the name of multi-purpose national identity card (MNIC)? It started in 2002 under the NDA, was mentioned by Abdul Kalam in his August 15, 2006 speech and has been quietly continued by the UPA since July 2004, with pilot projects in 20 sub-districts. Most pilots are in border regions; the only exceptions are Goa, Delhi, Andhra, Puducherry and Tamil Nadu, of which, only Delhi and Goa are urban in any sense. Among other things, MNIC will also link databases connected with admissions in educational institutes, health/medical services, ticket booking, SC/ST/OBC status, old-age pensions/disability, birth/marriage/death, property transactions, PDS, NREGA and the financial sector. In principle, this inter-connectivity should enable double-checks and reduce fraud.

But there are questions. Why is the government so quiet about the MNIC? This is so hush-hush that the website is still under construction, after four years. If cities are the focus of terrorism, why are Goa and Delhi the only urban centres for pilots? Implementation should be easier in urban India. For instance, in Murshidabad, according to reports, the pilot couldn’t verify 90 per cent of the population. Given government track records, why isn’t one outsourcing part of the identification function, including the use of communities? PAN cards never took off until their issuance was partly outsourced. Rather oddly, India provides IT services to the rest of the world and this encompasses security too. But we don’t use that skill and expertise at home. We also need another POTA — Prevention of Torpid Attitude.

... contd.