To be very honest, India does need a far reaching domestic debate on its nuclear programme: both the civilian and military aspects. As often happens in our discourse, we convert a means into an end. The 123 Agreement was supposed to be an instrument that enabled our nuclear programme to be recognised and for it to flourish. But we have to be very clear about what our own expectations from our nuclear programme are, and the sort of resources we are willing to commit to it. Is the civilian programme merely about energy or is it also about potentially being a technological leader? If so, what impact does the G-8 position on ENR have on our research ambitions? On the military side, we need clarity over the conditions under which signing the CTBT or FMCT will have little or no impact on our deterrence capabilities.

The only circumstances under which it makes sense for India to sign these treaties is if there is a clear path to global disarmament. In fact, that could be made more than a mere promissory note. The validity of these treaties could be made conditional on concrete steps towards disarmament. If those steps are not met, the treaties become null and void. The possibility of this happening is remote. But it will at least call the bluff of major powers who still want to use the nuclear issue to maintain a hierarchical and discriminatory world order.

The Obama Administration is once again dominated by traditional non-proliferation types; there are efforts underway to ensure that only a few countries can participate and control the fuel cycle. India's position in the global nuclear order is not as unambiguously accepted as we pretend after the 123 Agreement. We will once again need to be diligent and clear headed about what we want and how to get it.