The Russian bear, meanwhile, is growling again as imperialist sentiment grows in the corridors of the Kremlin. But it is not simply great power politics that is back in vogue; regimes in minor states such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Burma and North Korea have also been emboldened, and have begun to pursue their own brand of “values-based” foreign policy. Russia and China along with other authoritarian states have used their positions in the UN Security Council to block almost all proposed forms of intervention in places like Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. 

This divided world stands in stark contrast to the situation after the victory of the West in the Cold War. Neo-conservative commentators in the United States were ecstatic about a victory they took to be the ultimate triumph of Western values, especially of liberal democracy and capitalism. And in a fit of optimism after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Fukuyama declared not only an end to ideological struggle, but the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This enthusiasm was infectious; liberals soon began to argue that the spread of liberal political and economic values was important for global security; consequently, a coalition of liberals and neo-conservatives pushed a global interventionist agenda throughout the ’90s.

This culminated in the Iraq adventure, which was meant to be the first step towards the transformation of an entire region, an answer to the Islamist radicalism being spawned in authoritarian regimes through West Asia. The Iraq war confounded most ideological categories and shattered a lot of myths about the use of force as liberals found it hard to oppose a war that would remove a genocidal regime from power.

The idea that the democratisation of West Asia would be the best antidote to Islamist extremism seemed like an idea whose time had come. Yet today, the authoritarian regimes of the region — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria — are all stronger than before, with repression at an all-time high. Iran has emerged as the strongest power in the region, twiddling its thumbs at the impotence of the West in carrying out its threats over its nuclear programme and charting a foreign policy course that is more ambitious and radical than ever before. The liberal ideology of intervention has proved its limits, and is now confronted with a rapidly evolving reality.

Meanwhile, in the tradition of authoritarian regimes, the Chinese constructed a powerful pageant at the Olympics to boost officially sanctioned mass nationalism. It had been suggested in the West that the hosting of Olympics would ease China’s inevitable transition to a more open society. It is now clear that China’s Games instead hailed the success of an ideology in constructing a powerful state, restoring the nation’s sense of pride and greatness in passing.

Meanwhile, Russia has used the modern lexicon of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to disguise its aspirations to reassert its control in what it considers its own backyard, the Caucasus. The old battle-lines between Russia and the West are being redrawn, with the faintest of hopes that Russia would ally with the West dwindling rapidly. There will be no business as usual between Russia and NATO from now on. Russia has clearly stated its intention to reclaim its position as the primary geopolitical concern of the West.

With the war in Afghanistan going downhill and West Asia in turmoil, the West increasingly seems to be losing its ability to dictate terms to an emerging global order. Europe, in particular, is witnessing a steady loss of self-confidence, turning inwards and growing pessimistic about the future. Ideological competition is in full swing with the Russian foreign minister arguing that “for the first time in many years, a real competitive environment has emerged in the market of ideas between different value systems and development models.” According to him, the West is losing its monopoly on the globalisation process.

Raymond Aron, the great political philosopher of the last century, was right: “What passes for optimism is most often the effect of an intellectual error.” Liberal sentimentalism about internationalism and human nature led to post-Cold War complacency about its values. This complacency has come back to haunt it, a tad sooner than expected: history is back with a vengeance.

The writer teaches at King’s College, London express@expressindia.com