•They (the UPA) took great comfort from the fact that you came around to supporting the nuclear deal in the end.

I started supporting the nuclear deal when an assurance was given to me that the strategic programme is not being undermined. I have also been in favour of good relations with the United States.

•Did you try to convince the BJP leadership?

There was a dialogue in Atalji’s house between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Atalji, Advaniji and others. There was no need for me to convince anyone.

•Why didn’t that dialogue prove successful?

It is very difficult to say, but my reading is that there were some people in the BJP who said, ‘we have now taken a position and we can’t go back on it’.

•Would you call that excessive rigidity?

It was a political decision, let me put it that way.

•Was it a political mistake?

Yes. I am going to be lambasted by the BJP for this. You see, the nuclear deal was only one aspect of Indo-American relations. The vast majority of the middle class in this country wants good relations with the US and when you (the BJP) are opposing the nuclear deal, they took it to mean that you were opposing good relations with the US.

•Does that partly explain the fact that the BJP got routed in all the cities?

I don’t know.

•What you are saying is that it was not a smart political decision on the part of the BJP to oppose the nuclear deal because they actually alienated their key constituency?

They alienated a substantial section of the middle class.

•And part of the reason is that once they had taken a foot forward, it was difficult to step back?

This is the way I look at it, because some of them told me: “We have taken a decision, we can’t go back.”

•Did you try to persuade them?

I had talks with two or three people, but I am not going to name them.

•I will go back to the BJP issue. We talked about whether it should be a party of the centre-right or Hindu-right. The BJP has had three opportunities to fix this. Mr Vajpayee had one, Mr Advani had two. Mr Vajpayee’s opportunity came when the Gujarat riots took place. If he had taken a call on Modi then, things would have changed for the BJP. Second, Mr Advani’s Jinnah statement: if he had stayed firm on what he had said and articulated the reasons he had said it, maybe that was a second opportunity of placing the BJP closer to the right. Third was Varun Gandhi’s speech: when by just saying no to one person who was not capable of getting more than one or two seats — his own seat, Maneka could have won her seat anyway — the BJP could have achieved the same thing. What is it with these senior leaders that they lost all the three opportunities?

I can’t talk about what happened as far as Mr Narendra Modi is concerned, but I will admit openly that Mr Vajpayee and myself rarely discussed the political issues, the party issues.

•Was he deeply pained?

Obviously, and when he talked about rajdharma, he was explaining his anguish. There was a meeting in Goa where a decision was to be taken. Strong views were expressed from both sides at that meeting. Mr Vajpayee’s democratic instincts are so strong that if he sees that there is a very strong feeling in the party on an issue, he does not stand against it.

•Do you wish that he had taken a call on Mr Modi then?

I don’t want to get involved in legal issues, because cases are going on. I don’t think it would have been possible to say that Mr Modi should resign and leave. I don’t think that would have been possible in the BJP.

•n But it would have been possible to get him to make amends?

Yes.

•He still hasn’t done that; you still haven’t got one line in contrition from him.

The Supreme Court is doing something. I don’t want to get involved in this.

•And the other two instances I quoted — the Jinnah episode and the Varun Gandhi episode?

I don’t think he (Advani) has gone back on the Jinnah statement.

•And Varun Gandhi?

I am absolutely clear that his speech and his behaviour at that time did the greatest amount of damage to the BJP and the party should have totally moved away from him.

•Do you have any analysis as to why they didn’t do it?

I don’t know. They could have taken their own internal decision at that time. Mayawati came up with the NSA and it became very difficult for the BJP to...

•...If the BJP has to reposition itself as a modern, conservative, right of centre party in India, the second pole of Indian politics, ideologically, politically and philosophically, can it continue to show such deference to the RSS? Because it is an extra-constitutional centre of power. There is always an impression that the RSS decides who should be the leader, the RSS persuades Advani not to resign, the RSS persuades so and so to become this. How can this go on?

There is a link between the RSS and the BJP that cannot be broken. It is necessary today for not only the BJP to assess what has happened but also the RSS to make an assessment of its policies and ideologies. They must have another look at what their objectives are.

• You think there is need for the RSS to introspect?

They have to do it, because the election results were so disastrous that if you don’t make an assessment of the situation then you will never recover.

•You said at the very beginning of this conversation that people did not like the characterisation of the Prime Minister as weak.

By calling him the weakest prime minister, more publicity was given to the Prime Minister than he did for himself.

•It also evoked some sympathy?

This is the number one reason. It also led the Congress to say that so and so is our prime ministerial candidate, which only a few weeks before it was refusing to declare. This benefited the Congress. It also gave strength to Dr Manmohan Singh.

•And this repeated allegation of weakness allowed the Congress to hit back with Kandahar and the Parliament attack?

Obviously, that is the game of politics.

•Give us a final word on what happened on the Kandahar issue. That was an internal controversy. How was the decision taken? What were the considerations in agreeing to an exchange?

When the hijacking took place on December 24, the first mistake was committed in Amritsar where we had given instructions from Delhi to deflate the tyres.

•Who did you give the instructions to?

To the airport authority in Amritsar.

•That is the Air Force...

...Because they (the hijackers) had asked for refuelling.

•Why didn’t they do it?

It is very difficult for me to say that. There was no inquiry after that. The hijackers were very clever. They had kept the engines running. They hadn’t stopped. They hadn’t allowed the pilot to stop the engines. So there was very limited opportunity to do something then, which the critics don’t realise. Once the aircraft left Indian territory, what were their demands? Release 36 terrorists, give $200 million and let us take the remains of some two or three people, what they called Mujahideens, from their graves. The entire Cabinet Committee on Security rejected these demands. So to begin with, everybody was against agreeing to the conditions of the hijackers. Negotiations went on and they came down to three (terrorists) and there was no demand for $200 million.

•Are you absolutely sure that no money was given to them?

Absolutely, not a single paisa was given to them. The demand for the remains of the bodies was also dropped. The situation was like this: release of three versus release of 160. And everybody agreed, yes, we have to do it. And there was, I can’t call it an all-party meeting because I don’t know whether it was an all-party meeting or not, but the Congress was present and they were consulted. The end of it was that everything should be done to get the hostages back. Political parties and, if I may say so, also the media, incited the families of the hostages to demonstrate. Thus, there was no question of not agreeing to the release of these three terrorists and getting the hostages back.

•What brought more bad press to the NDA government was not just the release of terrorists but that Mr Jaswant Singh went on that plane with the terrorists. Where was the compulsion for him to go?

When that decision was taken in the Cabinet Committee on Security, Mr Jaswant Singh said that he wanted to go and make sure that everything was all right because he had received a message from the negotiators in Kandahar that it would be good for somebody at a high level to come here, because there could be some last-minute problems. None of us visualised that he was going there with the three terrorists.

•In the same plane.

Yes, at least I didn’t visualise it.

•All it would have taken was a second plane.

Yes. It was a very difficult situation. The reason for Mr Jaswant Singh going there, as it was given to the cabinet committee, was a very sound one.

•But Mr Advani says he wasn’t aware that he was going. He was aware of the exchange, but he wasn’t aware that Mr Jaswant Singh was going.

I think it was Mr George Fernandes who said that perhaps Mr Advani has forgotten that he was there.

•In retrospect, could you have handled this differently or if a situation like this arises again...

...The only place where it could have been handled differently was at

Amritsar.

•And also how Mr Jaswant Singh went to Kandahar. He could have gone by a second plane.

Maybe, but I didn’t visualise it that way. It became part of politics. But I don’t believe a word of any leader who says that he would have handled it differently, that they would not have released the three terrorists to save the lives of 160 hostages. I dare anyone to say that.

•You don’t agree with Mr Advani when he says that he didn’t know that Mr Jaswant Singh was going?

I have already quoted Mr George Fernandes. I think we should take a more detached view of this. It wasn’t good that Mr Jaswant Singh was travelling in the same plane, but he wanted to get these hostages back and we should concentrate on that.

•But that only came up because of the attacks on this government being weak on terrorism. It was a calamity that the BJP invited upon itself.

I think it also came because of the autobiography (L K Advani’s memoirs).

•The interesting thing is that while you say that you are not a political person and you are neither with the Congress nor the BJP, I am amazed at the kind of political insights you come up with.

I am grateful for the candour with which you talk.

Thank you for your compliment.

•Thank you very much.

Thank you.

Transcript prepared by Mehraj D Lone