•How could internal politics in India or China disrupt this narrative?

Of course, politics could completely put a landmine in this process, it is after all about responding to accidental events. While I am optimistic that there will be no reversal for globalisation, there is still that lurking ghost of a chance. It needn’t be domestic politics; it could be a regional flashpoint that could stir up things. China’s leadership must accommodate the demands for transparency and pluralism, while India’s economy is weakened by bad regional relations.

•You quote an Indian official saying ‘Both India and China think the future belongs to us. We can’t both be right.’ Though you rebut it, it’s a commonly held claim that our ambitions are too close for comfort.

India tends to be on the defensive in its dealings with China, as we saw with Tibet and Myanmar recently. But once it acquires more confidence with greater economic prowess, and military modernisation, that could change. India’s real vulnerability is its bad relations with all its neighbours, which China can exploit. I’d guess that China’s economic growth will probably plateau in about 15 years to about five per cent, while India’s will keep growing at 10 per cent.

•And how do these challengers affect the US’s top dog status? You mention that the US could end up playing a stabilising role in Asian rivalries...

The story about American decline is way overdone. Of course the debacle in Iraq was a big setback, as is the credit crunch, but the US is bound to bounce back. Like Madeleine Albright said, it is ‘the indispensable nation’, and we’re not living in a post-American world. India’s ties with the US will endure, no matter what administration. I would think that now that India has emerged as a significant force in Asia, the US will step back from Asia’s internal matters, as it should. Much like it has expressed its support for the EU.

... contd.