BY 1952, the last year of his presidency, Harry Truman recognised that the victory he had hoped for was no longer possible in Korea. US forces were not losing, but they were not winning, either. Instead they were caught up in a vast, bloody and expensive holding operation. Republicans were eager to criticise the Democrats for being soft on the communists. Others, even Democrats, asked how they could justify the deaths of 50,000 US troops without a clear win. Many, including South Korea’s President Syngman Rhee, had not given up on the dream of a unified Korea that would be an ally in the war against communism.

Truman’s successor, Dwight Eisenhower, as a legendary general, had enormous freedom to manoeuvre. He used it, ending new military offensives, conceding several key points to the North Koreans and the Chinese. On July 27, 1953, the parties to the war signed a peace treaty —all parties, that is, except the South Koreans, who believed the deal was a sellout.

For Americans, the Korean War was not a defeat—the United States had gathered a coalition to resist aggression—but it was certainly not a victory. After three years of fighting and 4 million dead, Korea remained divided—the North a communist bulwark, the South itself turning into a nasty dictatorship—Asia was bubbling over and the danger of war with the forces of international communism seemed greater than before.

Something like the close of the Korean War is, frankly, the best we can hope for in Iraq now. One could easily imagine worse outcomes—a bloodbath, political fragmentation, a tumultuous flood of refugees and a surge in global terrorist attacks. But with planning, intelligence, execution and luck, it is possible that the American intervention in Iraq could have a gray ending—one that is unsatisfying to all, but that prevents the worst scenarios from unfolding, secures some real achievements and allows the United States to regain its energies and strategic compass for its broader leadership role in the world.

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