Secondly, the object of the constitutional interpretation is to strengthen the EC in its independence. Just as in the context of judicial appointments the object in the Constitution was to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, in the second judges case (Supreme Court AOR Association) 1993, the Supreme Court interpreted the word “consultation” in the appointment of judges to be a binding consultation on the political executive. This was done on the rationale that “a fortori any construction of the constitutional provisions which conflicts with the constitutional purpose or negates the avowed object has to be eschewed being opposed to the true meaning and spirit of the constitution and, therefore, an alien concept.”

Thirdly, if the contrary argument were to be accepted, an absurdity would arise wherein if the allegation against an election commissioner is one of political bias, the beneficiary of the political bias, that is the ruling party, would then have the final say in deciding whether the incumbent is biased in its favour or not.

Fourthly, it is after a two decade long debate that the Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 606/1993 finally decided upon a settlement between the government of India and the EC that during the elections, the power to remove officers who indulge in delinquent conduct would be with the EC and not with the central or state government. The same would apply to the removal of a regional commissioner. The Constitution deals with the removal a regional commissioner or an election commissioner on the same basis. Can it be argued that the decision of the EC for removing officers or regional commissioners from election duties is not binding on the government? An approach leaning in favour of the government would destroy the independence of the EC itself.

... contd.