
As the representatives of the Dalai Lama head out to China today for the sixth round of consultations, the indications are that Beijing’s renewed engagement with the Dalai Lama since 2002 faces the prospect of becoming a false promise. On the eve of his departure to China, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, told this writer that Tibetan “sincerity and commitment alone can’t resolve the issue. The Chinese leadership must convince us and the rest of the world of its sincerity”.
Until recently, the Tibetan leadership has avoided quibbling in public with Beijing. Dharmashala, however, has begun to confront the likelihood that the talks with Beijing might go nowhere. Sceptics on the Tibetan side, who had always questioned the value of these talks, are gearing up to say, “We told you so!” Underlying the gathering Tibetan pessimism is the perception that China has hardened its position despite the many concessions offered by the Dalai Lama, including the repeated affirmation that he is no longer seeking independence for Tibet.
New Delhi is aware that a potential down-turn in Sino-Tibetan engagement could reinforce the negative dynamic that has begun to envelop the Sino-Indian boundary talks. On the face of it, these two negotiations are vastly different. One is about the internal reconciliation between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. The other is about a territorial dispute between New Delhi and Beijing. But both are ultimately about the future of Tibet, which remains a defining element in Sino-Indian relations.
Beyond all the populist and occasionally irresponsible rhetoric in New Delhi on Tibet, responsible elements in India recognise that Sino-Tibetan reconciliation and a final boundary settlement with China are intertwined. Progress on one front would make it a lot easier on the other.
To be sure, many Chinese analysts share the view that an accommodation of Tibetan aspirations could help transform Beijing’s relations with India and the subcontinent. Yet China is finding it difficult to temper its very traditional notions of sovereignty and territoriality over Tibet. Beijing has not responded to some creative Indian proposals seeking to shift the focus away from exchange of territories to building a cooperative Indo-Tibetan frontier. China, instead, has gone to extreme lengths to reaffirm its sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, especially on the Tawang tract. The same obsession appears to be threatening the negotiations with the Dalai Lama.
Until recently, neither Beijing nor Dharmashala was willing to reveal the state of play in their negotiations. After a series of recent media articles in China offering Beijing’s version of the story, the Tibetans too have gone public. In a major speech at the Asia Centre in Paris last month, Lodi Gyari spoke of the problems in the talks with China . One important issue relates to the characterisation of the past relationship between Tibet and China.
The Dalai Lama is ready to recognise the current reality that Tibet is a part of China. Beijing wants him to say Tibet “was always” part of China. The Tibetan leader insists that he can’t falsify the past; he wants both sides to avoid debates on history and construct a mutually beneficial future.
A second difficulty has been the geographic meaning of Tibet. The Dalai Lama wants that all the traditional Tibetan lands and people be brought under one political roof within China. Beijing insists that current internal borders drawn for the Tibet Autonomous Region correspond to the historical reality and cannot be altered. A third problem centres on the scope of autonomy for Tibet within China.
It is not the inherent political complexity of these issues that now threatens to derail the peace process between Beijing and Dharmashala. It is the declining mutual trust that is so critical for the success of any negotiation. The Tibetans are looking for a reassurance that they are not being strung out in an endless series of “talks about talks”. It is in Beijing’s own interest to offer some tangible interim gains to its Tibetan interlocutors. More fundamentally, China needs all the moral authority of the Dalai Lama to ensure that any settlement with the Tibetan people endures.
Beijing’s relentless demonisation of the Dalai Lama may look tactically smart. It is only the Dalai Lama who can help China consolidate its territoriality in Tibet, in its internal dimension as well as the external aspect involving India.
The writer is professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore