Note, among other things, the requirement of consensus. China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Hence, assume that at some stage we are compelled by circumstances to resume testing. Assume further that some country pleads in the NSG that, in fact, we had good reason to resume testing, that there are extenuating circumstances. That pleading would not get anywhere until China also agrees!

Furthermore, Section 4(2)(d)(4) prescribes, “If nuclear transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source.”

To ensure that the US Executive acquires the basis for such coordination — in the sense that it has at all times the fullest information about each item that it will urge others to stop exporting to India - Section 108(3) of the Senate Bill directs the US President to report to the Congress, among other subjects, on “any significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries.”

Similarly, Section 3(b)(1,2) of the Senate Bill specifies that, with respect of South Asia, the US shall aim to “(1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China (a curious insertion as China is no part of South Asia!) at the earliest possible date. (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the US and India become parties.”

... contd.