Nearly six years after it had first attacked the Kattunayake air base of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), the LTTE has again struck — in the early hours of March 26. Unlike the earlier ground attack, the Tigers have for the first time used their air wing, baffling everyone. It was a surprise, because two light aircraft flew all the way from Wanni and returned safely after inflicting sufficient damage on the air force fleet — and that at midnight. The Sri Lankan government has played down the attack, but it is pertinent to look at the air power of the LTTE: its intent, its strength, and threat potential.

The primary objective of the Vaanpuligal (‘Air Tigers’) is to counter the SLAF, which of late has been instrumental in the Tigers’ reverses in the East. The LTTE, in the early days, had used anti-aircraft guns to counter the SLAF. More recently, however, these guns have not been of much use because of SLAF’s advance fleet. The only option left for the LTTE, therefore, was to engage SLAF in the air. The LTTE also needed an air wing to demonstrate to its people and the world its capability of establishing a state structure. It now has air, sea, and land forces with intelligence, artillery, and commando wings. It is, significantly, the only militant group after the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ to acquire air power but, unlike the Contras, it did this without any external state support. It had declared 2000 the ‘Year of Air Tigers’ and during the Heroes’ Week of November 2004, the Air Tigers, for the first time, displayed their newly acquired aircraft at Mulliyavalai in Mullaitivu district, by sprinkling flowers on the graves of dead LTTE cadre. The air wing is useful for emergencies: to get supplies from outside the region or evacuate critically wounded cadre. But its most important utility is to deter the Sri Lankan government from indiscriminate bombing on LTTE-controlled areas.

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