That Musharraf has chosen to risk the good thing he has going with India can only lead to two possible conclusions. One, like all previous Pakistani leaders Musharraf is overplaying his leverage on cross-border violence at a moment when reasonable compromises on Kashmir seem at hand. The other might be that Musharraf is not in control over the terror apparatus or beginning to lose what control he had.

If the assessment is that Musharraf has over-reached, the first task of the UPA government is to disabuse him of all illusions about gaining more concessions on Kashmir through terror blackmail. The government has no option at this stage but to signal unambiguously, to both Pakistan and the international community, that the peace process is indeed reversible, and that India is fully conscious of all the consequences the reversal might entail.

If Musharraf is not willing or is unable to deliver an end to cross-border terrorism, the government could only conclude that it is no longer possible to do business with him.

Beyond these necessary signals, India must recognise that authoritarian rulers like Musharraf only care for their own survival in power. It is only by demonstrating that India can complicate his internal power calculus, that New Delhi can hope to achieve a change in Musharraf’s policies.