The 26-page letter was written to Berman’s predecessor, the late Tom Lantos, on January 16.

First reported by The Washington Post, the non-proliferation lobby projected the conversation as showing “duplicity” between what the US itself plans to follow and the “milder” exemption it’s seeking from NSG. The Left and the BJP seized on it to argue that India had bartered its sovereignty to the US.

A close look at the “secret revelations” only underlines what is already in the public domain: the Indo-US understanding on nuclear testing and the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology.

New Delhi refused to comment on the correspondence and said it would be guided by the agreement between US and India. On testing, the MEA spokesperson said: “Our position is well known. We have a unilateral moratorium on testing. This is reflected in the India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005.”

US envoy to India David Mulford said the letter had “no new conditions” and “no data...which has not already been shared in an open and transparent way with members of Congress and with the Government of India.”

A meeting of senior Congress Ministers was held this evening including Pranab Mukherjee, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan and Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar.

One question on which there is tremendous pressure in the NSG is to terminate all cooperation in case India were to test a nuclear device. Some NSG countries have argued that US should not resist this provision as it intends to follow the same course in the bilateral agreement with India.

To this, the State Department has very clearly stated that US has the “right to cease all nuclear cooperation immediately” in case India were to carry out a nuclear test but adds that it has the “right to terminate the agreement on one year’s notice” only after which the commitments under Article 5.6 (relating to fuel supply assurances)

would no longer apply.

In other words, during the one-year consultation period, the US will have to follow its commitments on ensuring uninterrupted fuel supply to Indian reactors.

Further, the letter qualifies: “Ceasing nuclear cooperation with India would be a serious step. The United States would not take such a step without careful consideration of the circumstances necessitating such action and the effects and the impacts it would entail.”

From the NSG standpoint, India is open to individual countries choosing to stop nuclear cooperation in case India were to detonate a device. However, New Delhi is against any multilateral assertion on it by the NSG. More so, it is open to have a consultation exercise on the lines of what is put down in the Indo-US 123 agreement.

The letter does state that fuel supply assurances are not meant to “insulate” India from the consequences of exploding a nuclear device but also argues that there is “neither a minimum nor a maximum quantity of nuclear material in India’s reserve”.

In the letter, the State Department has maintained that US follows a policy of not engaging in ENR transfers, but at the same time recognizes that India has ENR technology and so there would no negative impact on its initiatives to stop ENR trade. “We do not foresee any negative impact on these initiatives (to discourage ENR trade). India already possesses both type of facilities,” the State department wrote.

Further, the response makes it clear that it will not transfer any sensitive nuclear technology “outside” the 123 Agreement. In other words, any future transfer will take place within the confines of the agreement, which is consistent to what India expected. However, on the question of dual use technology to be used in Indian facilities for this purpose, the State Department makes it clear that it will do so under the “exceptions” specified in the Hyde Act. “If India were to develop such facilities, potential dual use transfers could be considered only under exceptions granted in the Hyde Act,” the letter says.

Here again, India is not against individual NSG members choosing like the US to apply conditions to ENR transfer. However, it is opposed to an assertion of this by a multilateral body as that would bind countries unwilling to place such restriction follow the same rules as few others.