Rafsanjani, president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, is a man very much of the Iranian establishment, with his network of political contacts and economic interests. He never exhibited the reformist inclinations of his successor, Mohammad Khatami — intentions that were dashed by the clerics. But he was very much a pragmatist, able to read accurately the leeway provided by the clerics as well as the mood of the moment in the bazaar. Iran does not allow for more than two successive terms for its president, so when he did stand for election in 2005, beating the moderate candidate in the run-off, it was Ahmadinejad, a non-cleric footsoldier of the Revolution, who was seen as the outsider.

It is doubtful that even if the moderates do gain greater say in Tehran — and regain the confidence of the supreme leader — there would be any rollback of the official insistence on the nuclear programme. So the sanction regime would still be salient. But Rafsanjani’s consolidation in official circles could break the non-communication between Tehran and the West. And given the brewing confrontation, that would make the region less dangerous.