But lightly the coalition forces did not tread on history. The Iraq adventure was never supposed to be a minor undertaking. It was meant to be the first step towards the transformation of the entire region as an answer to the Islamist radicalism being spawned by the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East. The neo-conservatives seemed to have succeeded where the liberals and the realists of yore had failed — in blending American values with American national interests. The Iraq war confounded most ideological categories and shattered a lot of myths about the use of force as liberals found it hard to oppose a war that would remove a genocidal regime from power. After all, it were the liberals who had been advocating a global interventionist agenda throughout the ’90s. The realists meanwhile found themselves isolated in a post-9/11 strategic environment where their argument for maintaining a balance of power as the best way to serve American national interests in the Middle East was fast losing currency.

The idea that democratisation of the Middle East would be the best antidote to Islamist extremism seemed like an idea whose time had come. Ideas, however, have strange ways of manifesting themselves in reality. Today, democratisation of the region is on no one’s agenda. Instead, the authoritarian regimes of the region — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria — are all stronger than before, with repression at an all time high. Iran, on the other hand, is the strongest power in the region: twiddling its thumbs at the impotence of the West in carrying out the threats over its nuclear programme, and charting a foreign policy course that is more ambitious and radical than ever before.

Iraq, meanwhile, continues to struggle for survival burdened with an incompetent political elite and a growing clamour for the withdrawal of forces in the United States. The “surge” has produced some significant gains for the US but the purpose behind the new strategy is to provide enough space for the Iraqis to make political progress. That political progress has not been satisfactory and the surge can continue indefinitely. The danger is that various unsatisfied groups are merely waiting in the wings to strike back once the momentum of the surge starts to slacken. The US voters will have a clear choice to make in November as John McCain is ready to support the US military presence in Iraq for as long as the political process in Iraq requires that presence, while his Democratic opponents are keen to get the troops home as soon as possible although neither is ready to give a timetable.

Americans are giving mixed reactions. In a remarkable turnaround, recent polls suggest that around 50 per cent now believe that they are winning in Iraq. A perception is gaining ground that the US can exit with some grace and even with the possibility of a “victory.” Iraq has, in many ways, become an American Rorschach test — Americans are seeing in it what they want to see.

Addressing the nation on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq last week, President George W. Bush was overwhelmed with emotion as he declared, “The surge has produced a result... this is a war that the US can and should win.” It was not the “mission accomplished” moment when on the USS Lincoln the president virtually declared victory. But the gusto with which Bush defended the US enterprise in Iraq signalled vividly that the old Bush was back. His confidence was merely a reflection of the changing public mood on Iraq.

The question is how long this public mood can last. Empires always fall and when they fall they are judged by the legacies they leave behind. The stakes remain as high as ever. If the US is successful in giving a modicum of stability to Iraq, and leave with a region relatively at ease with itself, the earlier mistakes of the Bush Administration will be viewed in a kinder light. If, however, the US decides to leave Iraq with various factions fighting with each other for political spoils and an entire region in turmoil as a result, then not only will this be a strategic defeat for the US but it will also come back to haunt it sooner than it will expect. In the aftermath of the failed Bay of Pigs fiasco, Arthur Schlesinger complained to John Kennedy, “We not only look like imperialists... we look like stupid, ineffectual imperialists, which is worst of all.” Today the US is once again facing the danger of looking like a “stupid, ineffectual imperialist.”

The exercise of power can be shocking and corrupting at times, but without power those battles also cannot be fought that must be fought. The reality that confronts policymakers is to wage those essential battles with humility and grace, recognising fully that they don’t have a monopoly on virtue. It is this reality that faces the US in the aftermath of the Iraq fiasco. History has a brutal way of making arrogance recognise its importance. Treading lightly is often the best alternative, something Tim Collins remembered but Bush and his team did not.

The writer teaches at King’s College, London

harsh.pant@kcl.ac.uk