Whether or not one endorses the 123 Agreement, it is something of a credit to the artfulness of India’s negotiators. But its ambiguities suggest that it is not the agreement itself, but its subsequent circumstances and interpretations that will determine how good it is for India. Critics of the deal should acknowledge that it could turn out to be greatly beneficial; but equally supporters of the deal should acknowledge the ways in which it could act as a serious fetter. Instead of focusing on the text, it is more useful to think about the conditions under which it will work to our advantage. The agreement’s soundness depends on your estimate of these conditions obtaining; as it also depends upon the still unresolved question of what our larger strategic doctrine is.

Thomas Jefferson once argued, “On the subject of treaties, our system is to have none with any nation as far as can be avoided. We believe that with nations as with individuals, dealings may be carried out advantageously, perhaps more so, while their continuance depends on a voluntary good treatment as if fixed by contract which, when it becomes injurious to either, is made by forced constructions to mean what suits them and becomes a cause of war instead a bond of peace.” Jefferson was wrong about avoiding treaties. But he was right that circumstances determine how injurious they are, and that dominant powers will put forced constructions upon them when it suits them. The US has a record of negating important treaties like the ABM when it chooses. It would be height of folly if we did not acknowledge that the benign constructions of the 123 Agreement will depend upon our keeping in America’s good books.

... contd.