Thomas Jefferson once argued, “On the subject of treaties, our system is to have none with any nation as far as can be avoided. We believe that with nations as with individuals, dealings may be carried out advantageously, perhaps more so, while their continuance depends on a voluntary good treatment as if fixed by contract which, when it becomes injurious to either, is made by forced constructions to mean what suits them and becomes a cause of war instead a bond of peace.” Jefferson was wrong about avoiding treaties. But he was right that circumstances determine how injurious they are, and that dominant powers will put forced constructions upon them when it suits them. The US has a record of negating important treaties like the ABM when it chooses. It would be height of folly if we did not acknowledge that the benign constructions of the 123 Agreement will depend upon our keeping in America’s good books.

Assuming the treaty goes through, its advantages or disadvantages will not be determined by the text itself. It will depend rather on complex sets of negotiations. There is still a constitutive ambiguity around how much strategic fuel reserve India will be able to build. While the agreement suggests the possibility of building up a considerable reserve, the Hyde Act conference report explicitly suggests that the “United States does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed as a result of India’s nuclear tests”. But whether this issue becomes an occasion for constructive fudging in India’s favour, or the creation of a possible vulnerability, will depend on two things. First, future developments in the political equations between India and the US. Second, the character of the actual contracts we give out for specific nuclear plants will have considerable bearing on the nature of fuel supplies we get. It is possible to use those contracts to secure more or less assurance in fuel supplies or at least ensure that others, not us, bear the risks of termination. A lot will depend on our tough-mindedness in leveraging that possibility.

There is a lesson we must learn from the Chinese. They enter into agreements only when they have done all the homework to leverage their domestic resources so that they can negotiate from a position of strength. Over the last decade we failed to use all available domestic resources to gain a position of strength. How much we are in a position to bargain to our advantage will depend not so much on the deal but on what we do with our resources. Arguably the separation allows an opportunity for accountability of our systems. More than the constraints imposed by the agreement, the critical variable is: can we get our domestic supplies and indigenous capabilities in order as insurance? This is connected to the third question: testing. Under the present agreement we are not any worse off than the status quo. Whether we test depends upon our capacity to internalise the costs consequent upon testing, a formal right is a non sequitur. Some fear that having made investments in nuclear plants will raise the costs of potential future testing. But this is far from clear; if we have intelligent, systematic plans it could raise the cost of imposing sanctions.

Fundamentally our future will depend on how we strategise; this agreement alone will neither make it nor break it. But it does require us to be prepared for hard-headed negotiations and contracts and not look for assurances or threats in parchment texts.

The same applies to the crucial clause in the agreement that is open-ended: the right of termination. Euphemisms about consultation and grave consequences of termination are neither here nor there. Underlying is a fundamental question. When can we be confident that the US will not impose it to our disadvantage? Either we have powerful enough lobbies in the US, which many think we are now in a position to create. The business of US foreign policy is business: their incentive becomes our leverage. But it would be foolish to overestimate this. For fundamentally, how the agreement gets interpreted will depend on how much in line we fall with the US’s overall perspective of the world. This is where the greatest danger might lie. There is reason to think that we are beginning to define the world as the US does.

For instance, flirting with the idea of a concert of democracies as an organising principle in international affairs is dangerous. It is nothing but a contrivance designed to humiliate Russia, China and Iran. The Missile Defence Initiative is nothing but a catalyst for another arms race. Outside of the historically exceptional circumstances of Germany and Japan, US intervention has been catastrophic for so many societies, and even with a change in administration it is not clear that this policy will recover from its ruinous path. In short, it is not in our interests to act as if we have a strategic congruence with the US. Especially, if the deal goes through, we will have to work harder to maintain our independence or Jefferson’s “forced constructions” will be upon us. In India there is a bizarre Dulles-inspired dichotomy: either you are with America or against it. But the more sensible position is to recognise that America is a wonderful society but can be a dangerous state.

The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research