Assuming the treaty goes through, its advantages or disadvantages will not be determined by the text itself. It will depend rather on complex sets of negotiations. There is still a constitutive ambiguity around how much strategic fuel reserve India will be able to build. While the agreement suggests the possibility of building up a considerable reserve, the Hyde Act conference report explicitly suggests that the “United States does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed as a result of India’s nuclear tests”. But whether this issue becomes an occasion for constructive fudging in India’s favour, or the creation of a possible vulnerability, will depend on two things. First, future developments in the political equations between India and the US. Second, the character of the actual contracts we give out for specific nuclear plants will have considerable bearing on the nature of fuel supplies we get. It is possible to use those contracts to secure more or less assurance in fuel supplies or at least ensure that others, not us, bear the risks of termination. A lot will depend on our tough-mindedness in leveraging that possibility.

There is a lesson we must learn from the Chinese. They enter into agreements only when they have done all the homework to leverage their domestic resources so that they can negotiate from a position of strength. Over the last decade we failed to use all available domestic resources to gain a position of strength. How much we are in a position to bargain to our advantage will depend not so much on the deal but on what we do with our resources. Arguably the separation allows an opportunity for accountability of our systems. More than the constraints imposed by the agreement, the critical variable is: can we get our domestic supplies and indigenous capabilities in order as insurance? This is connected to the third question: testing. Under the present agreement we are not any worse off than the status quo. Whether we test depends upon our capacity to internalise the costs consequent upon testing, a formal right is a non sequitur. Some fear that having made investments in nuclear plants will raise the costs of potential future testing. But this is far from clear; if we have intelligent, systematic plans it could raise the cost of imposing sanctions.

... contd.