Opinion Undoing the network

At the top of the list of “specific steps” put forward by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to Islamabad last week was the launch of army operations against the Haqqani network,which has destabilised Afghanistan with its sanctuaries in North Waziristan,part of Pakistan’s troubled western borderlands.

The network headed by Afghan Pashtun warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani is allied with the AfghanTaliban and is said to have close links to al-Qaeda. More importantly,the Haqqani network has been nurtured and supported by the Pakistan army’s spy agency,the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Earlier this month,Washington put a top commander of the Haqqani network,Badruddin,son of Jalaluddin,on the list of those involved in or supportive of terrorist organisations. Badruddin’s brother Sirajuddin,another top commander of the network,is said to be on a list of top five terrorists that Clinton gave Islamabad last week.

The US is apparently demanding immediate action against them by the Pakistan army. The others in the list are said to be two senior al-Qaeda figures,Ayman al-Zawahiri and Atiya Abdel Rahman; the leader of the Afghan Taliban,Mullah Mohammad Omar; and Ilyas Kashmiri,who runs the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI).

While the American demands for action against the Haqqani network are not new and have been on the table for years,Kayani’s apparent willingness to act now seems to be one of the main results of the post-Osama pressure on Pakistan from Washington.

The Pakistan army has long seen the Haqqani network (besides the Taliban) as one of its instruments to gain influence in Kabul after the departure of the American and international forces from Afghanistan in the not-too-distant future.

Kayani had sought to promote contact and talks between the Haqqanis and the Afghan president,Hamid Karzai. Not surprisingly,Kayani had found all possible excuses to avoid taking action in North Waziristan. The Obama administration has reportedly made it clear that if the Pakistan army did not act against the Haqqanis,the US and allied forces would act unilaterally.

That the United States did not ease up on the drone attacks and the NATO helicopters have continued to violate Pakistani airspace to attack terrorist hideouts in North Waziristan have constrained Kayani’s choices.

While the Pakistan army has not confirmed the reports on the impending operations in Waziristan,the local population and the aid groups operating there have been notified.

Sceptics,however,will wonder if the Pakistan army will really go after one of its most important strategic assets.

They argue Kayani might find a way to whittle down the US demands. They insist that Kayani might demonstrate some military motion in North Waziristan but will resist American pressures for a decisive movement against the Haqqani network. The coming weeks will reveal how far Kayani will go and how much slack Washington is ready to cut him.

Kayani’s turn

Whether he acts purposefully against the Haqqani network or not,Kayani will have to face some political backlash at home. Having raised anti-American rhetoric to new heights and unsuccessfully played the China card in recent weeks,Kayani will want to be seen by the Pakistan people as bowing to American demands.

Some Islamic parties — including the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami — have already declared their opposition to Kayani’s move,but the army knows how to manage the noise from these groups and the national security hawks occupying the electronic media space.

Kayani will also have to cope with the bold retaliatory moves by various extremist organisations,including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,on the country’s urban targets and military installations. Since the killing of Osama,the TTP has launched large terrorist attacks,including one on the Mehran naval station in Karachi a few days ago.

The India excuse

While Pakistan has deployed more than a 100,000 troops on its western borders to counter the insurgent groups on its borderlands,it will need a lot more troops if it is to make a decisive military impact in North Waziristan.

This,in turn,would mean moving troops away from the Indian border. Kayani has often argued that he can’t act in North Waziristan because of the perceived threat on the Indian border.

Sections of the Pakistan media are already pointing to the dangers from the current Indian military exercises on the borders. Delhi,one can only presume,is smart enough to avoid presenting itself as the easy excuse for the Pakistan army for not acting in North Waziristan at this juncture.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi