• Are the rest of the reactors enough to produce that?

Let me explain that in detail. India has a no-first-use policy, which means you have to have enough weapons, both nuclear and thermal, to get your potential, so that your enemy knows that he could be targeted if he were to initiate such things. In these times, the credibility of that risk has to remain high.

• A country like Pakistan almost has the first-use policy.

It has said very clearly that it doesn’t rule it out. Even then I came to the conclusion that by agreeing to the separation plan, by agreeing to work with the U.S. and not others on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the 2005 agreement in Geneva, the government was showing little concern in this respect. But since I have very good relations with the U.S., I recognise that this deal has a very important role in the strategic partnership between the two countries.

• How much is enough in terms of fissile material? How many reactors would you have put under safeguards?

Not more than two.

• This government says it has top secret documents that you had offered to put 70 per cent of the facilities under safeguards for a deal that was half of this deal.

That is not correct. In 2003, when I was in Washington, we said we would put a couple of our reactors under safeguards. And all those to be built would be under international surveillance. The Americans did not respond to this suggestion. If they had, it would have become clear what would be put under safeguards. If I were there, I’d not have put more than two under safeguards.

... contd.