Thank you, for your very kind words. We have met after a long time.

• How does the picture look to you back home in Pakistan?

That’s very disturbing. Pakistan, unfortunately, is not in good hands. It’s not in good shape. Musharraf is mishandling Pakistan. And one by one, he is hitting at the very roots of the country. For example, he subverted the Constitution, abrogated the Constitution, and staged a coup against my government, which was a democratically elected government with two-thirds majority. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that any single party got a two-thirds vote in the Parliament.

• But he (Gen Musharraf) says it was so corrupt that the people of Pakistan were happy that he got rid of it.

There’s no evidence of any corruption against my government or against me. Look here, now the Chief Justice of Pakistan, who has been suspended and removed by Mr Musharraf unconstitutionally, gave a verdict against this government saying, ‘We smell corruption in this transaction.’ And then Transparency International said that Pakistan is one of the prominent countries that have a very high corruption rate. So these two are very glaring examples of corruption that is rampant today in Pakistan. So if he says that (my government was corrupt) he is absolutely wrong.

• When you were removed, there was no public outcry, no protests. That’s what surprises me also. You had just won with a two-thirds majority, and someone comes and removes you, and nothing happens, not a whimper.

I think that’s out of fear of the army. That was out of the fear of the uniform, which has now dissipated to a very large extent.

•So there was a fear of the uniform?

Yes, it is also surprising that when the late Bhutto was hanged nobody came out on to the streets. I think even then there was this fear of the uniform. But the fear of the uniform has not been a good thing in Pakistan and the army’s intervention — and intervention every now and then, I think — has been damaging for Pakistan.

• But the fear of the army should be for the enemy. Not for its own people.

Well, our generals have been trying to scare our own people more than the enemy. So they felt that with the uniform they could intimidate their foes, intimidate politicians, scare the people.

• But you think now that this fear is gone?

To a very large extent, which is a very good thing for democracy.

• So what are you fighting for? You are fighting for becoming the prime minister again, obviously?

I’m not looking for prime ministership. I am not looking to form a cabinet or a government. I think that, more important than forming a government, more important than even fighting the elections, is to put the country back on the rails, to go back to the Constitution of 1973, the late Mr Bhutto’s Constitution, to shut the doors on the army, on the generals, and to come into politics.

• Forever?

Forever. And that requires courage. That requires struggle, patience.

• So there’s going to be no give and take this time. Because in Pakistan it is always said that there is this uneasy compact between the establishment, the army, and the politician. No longer?

I think it is a very clear departure from the past, where people used to strike a deal with the generals and do some give and take and then make compromises on principles. I think now it is principles that are more important than any political experience.

• Even you have done it the first time, when Ghulam Isa Khan was president.

No, I did not. I never entered into a deal with Ghulam Isa Khan.

• I have been a journalist for nearly three decades. But the most fascinating moments of my reporting years were while accompanying you on that train ride from Islamabad to Lahore. You had been dismissed by Ghulam Isa Khan and your supporters on the train were playing Faiz’s Hum dekhenge. And if you remember correctly, that is the song around which the movement against Zia was built. And I thought how funny it was. You were known to be close to Zia, and now your supporters are following the same tactic.

Well, I have very fond memories of your visit to Pakistan. Those were very good times. We were trying to strengthen the roots of democracy in Pakistan. And unfortunately these power-hungry generals try to derail democracy. Now, for example, in the 60 years of Pakistan’s history, 33 years have gone to the army. In fact we have dictatorship in Pakistan for 33 years and the rest of the 27 years we had democratic governments, with perhaps 15 to17 prime ministers. And three or four generals of Pakistan ruled for 33 years. So I think it’s very unfortunate. Our country was not created by Qaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to be ruled by the army or the generals. It was meant to be a democratic country, ruled by the people of Pakistan. That is the tragedy.

• Let me ask you a question, and answer it honestly. Make a comparison between Gen Zia and Gen Musharraf.

Don’t ask me to do that. All that I know of Mr Musharraf is that he is a very erratic, very impulsive, and a very unpredictable man. He was appointed by me as Chief of Army Staff, and he stabbed me in the back. Without any rhyme or reason, he removed my government, staged a coup against my government. He was planning to do so. He was a very unreliable man.

• You think he had planned it, or it happened in the spur of the moment?

I think he was planning it after the Kargil episode. Actually, it was my government, on the Pakistani side, which averted a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. I think it is a tremendous service to humanity. I am also very grateful to then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who also extended full cooperation. And he also felt let down. He also felt he was being stabbed by his Pakistani counterpart. I think he also has said , ‘I didn’t know that Mr Nawaz Sharif would stab me in the back.’ Not knowing that Nawaz Sharif himself was being stabbed in the back by his own Chief of Army Staff.

• So would you like to tell Mr Vajpayee now that you never stabbed him in the back?

No.

• And you say on your honour . . .

If I say I never deceived him or I never stabbed him in his back, I say it from my heart not from my mouth.

• Kargil was as much a surprise to you as to him?

Yes, the tape has all the evidence in that, the conversation between Gen Musharraf and Gen Aziz is the clear proof of that. I think it says it all.

• Did the Indian side give it to you?

I got it through a source. And I handed it over to Mr Musharraf also. I said, ‘You have been trying to hide something from me. Now listen to this.’ He was stunned. He had nothing to say. And that was, I think, the turning point. That was the turning point.

• Did he respond? Did he say it was not his voice?

No, no. How could he deny that? Even a fool would know it was Musharraf talking.

• What does it say about somebody at that level to be carrying out such an operation and to be speaking on open lines?

Even his close confidants, his corps commanders and two chiefs of the armed forces, the Chief of Air Staff, and the Chief of Naval Staff, were not aware of the Kargil adventure.

• If you are doing this, can you be having a conversation on an open phone line that can be picked up by somebody. What does it say?

Well, I was also a little surprised and I was also shocked how somebody had taped this conversation. And the quality of the tape was very, very clear. So I was stunned, I was shocked that who taped it. And I gave it to him.

• Did you make him listen to it in front of you?

No, I handed it. He took it back to his headquarters. He listened to it there. Then he called up my military secretary saying, ‘Well, how did the PM get this tape?’ And he had nothing else to say. He couldn’t deny it. He couldn’t back out.

• Because he has gone around saying after that, that you were in the picture and that you had at one point excitedly even asked, ‘Now that you have Kargil, how much longer to Srinagar?’

It was totally the other way round. I was confronting them. After having known what happened in Kargil, I confronted them. I said, ‘Why did you launch an attack on Kargil?’ And he couldn’t give me any satisfactory answer. I said, ‘Please tell me, could you reach Srinagar from Kargil?’ He said, ‘No.’ I said, ‘Where do you go from Kargil, except back?’ He said, ‘Nowhere. We will have direct control on the highway which leads to Siachen and Ladakh.’ So I said, ‘Was this the only purpose to launch an attack in Kargil? So what would you get by occupying Kargil?’ They had no satisfactory answer. I said this a very ill-planned adventure. This is ill-planned, ill-conceived, ill-executed.

• Have you read his book?

I started reading his book. I think it’s a pack of lies. While reading I came to the conclusion that all the facts have been distorted so I stopped reading it. I think it’s all distortion of facts. Nothing but lies.

• At which point did you decide there should be a ceasefire and a pullback? Did you decide, or did he ask for it?

I was in favour of a ceasefire from the beginning. I knew that Kargil will not get us anywhere, except spoil the relations between the two countries. Mr Musharraf is also guilty of subverting the process of normalisation of relations between the two countries.

• Yes, because you had just had a wonderful summit meeting with Mr Vajpayee.

Yes, Mr Vajpayee rightly felt let down. Mr Musharraf derailed the process and the man who is guilty of derailing the process today claims that he is the biggest supporter of peace between the countries

• So what was the story? I should ask you. We were all there in Lahore when Mr Vajpayee came and there was this story with the Pakistani press that the generals were unhappy with the meeting, with the thaw that was happening, and they in fact refused to salute Mr Vajpayee as well?

That’s not true. In fact everybody appreciated that. Everybody was very happy that Prime Minister Vajpayee came to Pakistan on a state visit. If Mr Musharraf was not happy, it’s a different matter. I think the majority of the corps commanders were very happy.

• Did Musharraf ever express his displeasure with you?

He had no business to do that. He had no authority. He may have felt it in his heart, but never said it to my face.

• So it’s absolutely wrong that he protested?

That was totally false.

• When did you first suspect that he was up to no good?

After Kargil. Woh kehte hain na, chor ke dari me tinka hai. So Kargil was a turning point.

• So Kargil was the tinka in the dari. Is it true, I have read you saying it somewhere, but not so clearly, that he wanted to be extricated from Kargil? Even he realised that he was stuck there badly, and that he needed your help with a ceasefire and a pullback?

That’s true.

• Because his side of the story was that they were doing pretty well. India was under pressure and you squandered away that opportunity by losing nerve.

That’s an afterthought. That’s a fabrication. And he is the one who actually suggested to me that I should meet Mr Clinton to bring about an honorable ceasefire between the two countries. And on his recommendation I sought an interview with Mr Clinton.

•I am sure he will have something to say in response. But you stand by what you say? You have a good memory.

Yes. He also gave a statement that appeared in a newspaper just a day before I went to the US. So how can he deny that. But if he wants to deny that, that’s a different matter, because, as I told you, he has no respect for his words. He gave a pledge to the nation that he will take off his uniform by December 31, 2004. He did not. He backed out.

• Now he says it’s his second skin.

That has also become a joke in Pakistan. He is ridiculing the army. And the army, which is a national institution today, is being damaged by its own Chief of Army Staff.

• It’s been damaged in what sense?

It’s been politicised. It is in politics up to its neck. And the intelligence agencies of Pakistan have been extensively used for rigging the elections in 2002.

• But your partner Benazir Bhutto is ready to make some kind of compromise. They are losing patience.

We have signed a Charter of Democracy. I and Benazir Bhutto are signatories to the Charter of Democracy and the charter clearly says no parleys with military dictatorships. It speaks of good governance, speaks of freedom of press, independence of judiciary. And I stand by each and every word of that charter. That’s the best document after the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.

• So you want to decide, once and for all, whether or not the army will have any role in the country’s politics.

I think all these matters needs to be now finally settled. We can’t afford this kind of dictatorship. These are now defining moments and we should take the struggle to its logical end.

•And you have the spine and the staying power to do it?

Yes. I think all these seven-eight years, both in jail and in exile, have strengthened my determination.

•When you were in captivity, did the thought cross your mind that Musharraf could do to you what Zia did to Bhutto?

Well, it was touch and go. It was a close call. Anything could have happened. Musharraf really wanted to secure a death penalty for me, from the judge in Karachi.

•Had you got the death penalty, would he have actually delivered it?

Yeah, certainly, no doubt about it.

•He was charging you with hijacking.

He turned me into a hijacker. Look, from a prime minister, I became a hijacker all of a sudden. This was an afterthought.

•Were you treated well? I know you were handcuffed.

It becomes very personal, if I talk about that. He did handcuff me. That’s right. And he also kept me in solitary confinement. He mistreated me and also my family.

•Why did he let you go? That’s so unlike a brutal dictator. Is there a human side to him?

He gave an explanation for it. I think he felt that I was becoming a problem for his government. He said my wife was creating a problem for his government. People were rallying around my wife when she came out on to the streets and she never had anything to do with politics. But circumstances brought her out. Because there was no male member who was allowed to move out. They were confined to either jails or were under house arrest. He was feeling very uncomfortable. My presence in Pakistan was creating problems for him. So if I were sent out, it would be easier for him.

•What’s your equation with Mr Vajpayee? You said Mr Vajpayee thought you had stabbed him in the back. When did you first find out what was happening in Kargil

When Mr Vajpayee called me. He called me on the phone. He said, ‘Mr Nawaz Sharif are you aware of what is happening in Kargil?’ That was when I came to know about that. Well, Mr Musharraf had kept it a secret from me and his other colleagues and this was revealed later. I was stunned when I heard from Mr Vajpayee that our regular troops and regular army were engaged in this battle in Kargil.

• So what happened when you took it up with Musharraf? The tape came subsequently, but when you took it up with Musharraf, did he say, ‘It’s nothing, forget it. Koi bari baat nahi hai, yeh chalta rehta hai.’

No, no. He didn’t say that. He also tried to cover up in one of the meetings of the defence committee in the cabinet. But the taped conversation between Mr Musharraf and Gen Aziz said everything.